1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT			
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON			
3	PORTLAND DIVISION			
4	INTERD GENERA OF AMERICA			
5	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )			
6	Plaintiff, ) Case No. 3:17-cr-00226-JO )			
7	v. ) ) July 16, 2018			
8	W. JOSEPH ASTARITA, )			
9	Defendant. ) Portland, Oregon )			
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14	PRETRIAL CONFERENCE			
15	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS			
16	BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. JONES			
17	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SENIOR JUDGE			
18	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SENTOR BUDGE			
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1			APPEARANCES
2	FOR THE	PLAINTIFF:	GARY Y. SUSSMAN
3			U.S. Attorney's Office 1000 SW Third Avenue
4			Suite 600 Portland, OR 97204
5	FOR THE	PLAINTIFF:	Torciana, on 57204
6			PAUL T. MALONEY U.S. Attorney's Office
7			1000 SW Third Avenue Suite 600
8			Portland, OR 97204
9	FOR THE	DEFENDANT:	DAVID H. ANGELI
10			Angeli Law Group 121 SW Morrison Street
11			Suite 400 Portland, OR 97204
12	FOR THE	DEFENDANT:	101010101, 011 17.101
13			TYLER FRANCIS Angeli Law Group
14			121 SW Morrison Street Suite 400
15			Portland, OR 97204
16	FOR THE	DEFENDANT:	JOANNA PERINI-ABBOTT
17			Angeli Law Group 121 SW Morrison Street
18			Suite 400 Portland, OR 97204
19		DEFENDANT:	POICIAIIU, OR 9/204
20	FOR THE	DEFENDANI.	ROBERT M. CARY Williams & Connolly LLP
21			725 Twelfth Street NW Washington, DC 20005
22	FOR THE	DEFENDANT:	nabilingcon, De 20005
23		DUL DUDUN I .	MEGHAN A. FERGUSON Williams & Connolly LLP
24			725 Twelfth Street NW Washington, DC 20005
25			

COURT REPORTER: Jill L. Jessup, CSR, RMR, RDR, CRR, CRC United States District Courthouse 1000 SW Third Avenue, Room 301 Portland, OR 97204 (503)326-8191 

## TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

(July 16, 2018)

(In open court:)

THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. Have a seat, please.

MR. SUSSMAN: Good morning, Your Honor, Gary Sussman and Paul Maloney, appearing for the United States. This is the time and place set for the final pretrial conference in the case of United States of America v. W. Joseph Astarita. Case No. 3:17-cr-226. Mr. Astarita is not present this morning, having previously waived his appearance; however, he is represented by five attorneys this morning. They are Mr. Rob Cary and Ms. Meghan Ferguson from the Williams & Connolly firm in Washington, D.C. Mr. Dave Angeli and Tyler Francis and Ms. Joanna Perini-Abbott from the Angeli Law Firm.

Your Honor, there's a number of matters pending before the Court for resolution this morning, and the government is ready to proceed in whichever order the Court desires.

THE COURT: Thank you. I'll proceed.

First of all, we have resolved the jury issues. We had 300 jurors noticed. Of those, 150 responded that they would be available. That has since reduced to 118. The jurors are scheduled to come in Tuesday. The issue on the jury questionnaire has been resolved. There will be a jury questionnaire, the joint questionnaire only, and that will be

submitted to the jury when they come in at 8:00 a.m. on a week from tomorrow, and the jury commissioner estimates that it will take them about an hour to fill out the -- those questionnaires, and that will be reformatted because some of the questions are open-end questions that will require some writing. So I'll ask whoever -- whichever side prepared those to coordinate with the jury commissioner, who I introduced you to this morning, so that she can then make up, from her computer, the jury questionnaire and make the copies and so forth.

Yes, sir.

MR. MALONEY: Yes, Your Honor. Paul Maloney for the government. I think that task is going to fall to me. The parties wanted to clarify with the Court whether you wanted the juror questionnaire that was previously submitted or the joint jury voir dire that the parties submitted with our pretrial documents.

THE COURT: The joint one.

MR. MALONEY: The joint one that we submitted with our pretrial conference documents?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MALONEY: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Any questions?

Yes, and we will call in 75 so that we aren't bringing in -- that's the agreed -- the commissioner said you were asked

how many do you want physically here, and both parties reported 75; is that correct?

MR. CARY: Yes, Your Honor. That's correct.
Rob Cary for Mr. Astarita. 75 is fine.

One point of clarification, I believe I have this right, and government counsel can correct me if I'm wrong, but we did have a joint questionnaire that was already formatted with more space that we had done. It had one additional question that we wanted on it that was taken out when it became -- we thought it was going to be voir dire instead of a written question, and our proposal would be that we actually provide that joint written questionnaire that's already formatted, that the jury commissioner could change a little bit if she needs to, but provide that. I think it would remove one additional step from the process.

THE COURT: Do you agree?

MR. MALONEY: We're fine with that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's fine. It's up to you, then.

The next issues -- I have your witness list. Jointly, the parties have requested 100 witnesses, approximately. The -- I have only the names of those. The government has requested, I believe, 72. Just a minute. Yeah, I have it here.

MR. MALONEY: Yes, Your Honor, there are 72 witnesses there.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MALONEY: We have included some of them, even 1 2 possible -- possible rebuttal witnesses. We think at trial we may be able to narrow the issues. 3 I warned you. It's not at trial that 4 THE COURT: 5 we're going to make these decisions. It's today. Final pretrial conference means what witnesses are you going to call? 6 7 MR. MALONEY: And, Your Honor, those are --THE COURT: Did I make that clear? 8 MR. MALONEY: Yes, you did, Judge, and those are all 9 10 the potential witnesses that we need the jurors to identify 11 whether they know or have conflicts with before they testify. 12 Some of them are trial case-in-chief witnesses. We included possible rebuttal witnesses, as well, in order to be thorough 13 14 and complete. 15 THE COURT: Let me ask you -- have a seat. The defendant's witness list is an additional 19 with an 16 17 additional 8 as possible impeachment. Of course, the 18 impeachment witnesses they won't know whether to call until 19 you've had the direct testimony. I do note that the defense 20 lists the defendant, W. Joseph Astarita, as testifying. 21 It's -- it says "the defense may call." The last time I talked to you, you said you hadn't decided. 22 23 MR. ANGELI: That remains the case, Your Honor.

of course, it will be Mr. Astarita's decision at the end of the

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day.

THE COURT: Say that again now. 1 2 MR. ANGELI: It remains the case that we have not yet decided, and, of course, it will be his decision at the end of 3 4 the day. 5 That's fine. That's not unusual. THE COURT: Of your 72 witnesses that you've listed, can you tell me 6 7 for sure which ones are going to testify? Would you like some time to -- later on this morning to advise the Court? 8 MR. MALONEY: If we could advise the Court later this 9 10 afternoon, after the pretrial rulings, that may provide some clarity in which we can narrow the witness list, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Normally, at the final pretrial 12 13 conference we have the list of the people and one sentence or a 14 small paragraph of what they're going to say. 15 Are you prepared to do that? 16 MR. MALONEY: We can provide that to the Court. I'm 17 not sure if I can get -- I can get that to you in writing 18 tomorrow morning. 19 THE COURT: I don't need it in writing. I just need 20 to know what they're going to say and who they are and whether 21 there's any objection to them. That's what we -- we're here to 22 clarify. So tomorrow morning won't work. I'll cover Motion in Limine No. 119. That is to preclude 23 24 the lay opinion of then-Police Officer Wes Murphy regarding the 25 left rear wheel of Finicum's truck. I thought we had that

resolved.

MR. SUSSMAN: Yes and no, Your Honor. We still don't have -- we still object to Officer Murphy testifying as to his opinion as to whether or not the left wheel continued to spin and for how long because we don't think he's qualified to give that opinion. However, they have since brought in an automotive mechanic, who, assuming his qualifications pan out at trial, probably would be qualified to testify to that. So we don't have an objection to the qualified automobile mechanic testifying to that, but we don't think a police officer is qualified to give that opinion testimony.

THE COURT: All right. Now, let's -- so we still understand each other, you do not require anybody to testify, expert or from lay experience, that when you have a stick shift -- which we have; right?

MR. SUSSMAN: Right.

THE COURT: And that the -- you can have the motor running and the wheels spinning at the same time, is that correct, while in -- while in the snowbank?

MR. SUSSMAN: With nobody behind the wheel of the car?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. SUSSMAN: That's where I think we do need someone with some expertise to testify to that, Your Honor, because when we spoke with Officer Murphy, he started talking about

transmission differentials and all this other stuff. We asked him, "Are you a mechanic?"

He said, "No."

We asked him, "Are you an engineer?"

We asked him, "Are you a trained accident reconstructionist?"

And he said, "No."

He said, "No."

He just has this general experience, you know, of having driven for a number of years and having been stuck in the mud one time, and we don't think that qualifies him to offer opinions on what differentials do and whether one wheel can continue spinning, even though others can't, with a manual transmission that's stuck in the snow and nobody behind the wheel.

Now, if they have a qualified automotive mechanic that can testify to that, let the mechanic testify to that. The officer can testify what he saw, his personal observations. We have no problem with that.

THE COURT: Which is what? What he did see?

MR. SUSSMAN: When the truck was removed from the snow, he saw what was described as a rut underneath the left rear wheel that had a coating of ice on it, and he saw what we described as -- I think he called it scrapings, or something like that, on the -- on the wheel.

Is that what you've agreed to? 1 THE COURT: 2 MR. SUSSMAN: We don't have a problem with his personal observations. 3 THE COURT: Does that include wheel turning? 4 5 MR. SUSSMAN: That's his opinion that goes on top of that. 6 7 THE COURT: Is that an opinion, or is it an observation? 8 MR. SUSSMAN: He doesn't observe the wheel turn. 9 10 wasn't there. All he saw was -- he came hours later with the 11 rest of the investigators. He reached a conclusion that the 12 wheel continued to spin for some time, and that's what caused the rut, and that's what caused the freezing, and that's what 13 caused the scraping, and he opined that that could happen even 14 15 though all the rest of the wheels were firmly stuck up to their 16 axles in the snow, and that's what we think requires expert 17 testimony. 18 MR. ANGELI: Good morning, Your Honor, we do, indeed, 19 intend to call --20 THE COURT: If you just remain seated and speak into 21 the microphone, please. 22 MR. ANGELI: Will do. 23 Your Honor, we will be calling an expert witness, an 24 expert mechanic, to talk about the issues with the 25 differentials and the manual transmission and the like.

With respect to Detective Murphy, he's a 10-year member of the Bend Police Department. He's a detective. He's been extensively trained in crime scene processing. He's lived in eastern Oregon for apparently 50 years, and his testimony will be, "I got there, and here's what I saw. I saw when that truck was pulled out there was smooth ice underneath the left rear tire. There was ice and snow that had been kicked up on the sidewall of that tire, and that, to me, based on all of my experience and training, is consistent with that left wheel having spun for some period of time after the truck came to a stop."

And we believe that that is heartland Rule 701. It's a -it's the lay opinion based on -- you know, as the Ninth Circuit
has said, a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life.
This is a detective who's going to say all of these things are
consistent with what I've seen in my life and in my career as a
police officer as being consistent with that wheel having spun.

THE COURT: His experience is limited to wheels spinning in some mud?

MR. ANGELI: I think his experience -- all of us probably, Your Honor, would draw that -- a similar conclusion from the observations that he made, and he's been processing crime scenes for ten years and --

THE COURT: I'm not worried about that. I am concerned about what he saw at the time.

MR. ANGELI: And that is what he saw at the time. 1 2 wheel --THE COURT: I'll limit him to what he saw at the 3 time. Any conclusions beyond that, I'll take as an offer of 4 5 proof, and he'll either admit it or reject it at that time after I've heard him. 6 7 MR. ANGELI: Okay. So we'll lay a foundation, Your Honor, and then you'll make a decision? 8 THE COURT: 9 Yes. 10 MR. ANGELI: Okay. Thank you. Then, procedurally, somebody still asked 11 THE COURT: for an instruction on sidebar conferences. I thought if I ever 12 communicated anything to anybody -- we never do that in this 13 jurisdiction. Ever. So we don't have sidebar conferences. 14 15 If you have something to take up with the jury, we have 16 the jury go into recess -- step out. We don't have whispering 17 contests up here. We don't approach the bench and offer this 18 and offer that. That just isn't done. So I hope we've made 19 that clear. So that instruction will not be given, and we 20 won't go into that any further. 21 The next issue is the opinion of Officer 3 as to what he 22 believed or who fired the shot that hit the roof of Finicum's

My ruling is to exclude that as an improper -- just his

estimate or guess. The -- unless somebody wants to be heard,

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that's my ruling.

MR. ANGELI: Your Honor, may I be heard briefly?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ANGELI: Okay.

THE COURT: No, you can be heard. That's -- I want you to -- now is to be heard, brief or not. Just say what's on your mind.

MR. ANGELI: There were two grounds upon which we moved -- which we opposed the motion regarding Officer 3. I think I've heard Your Honor's ruling, so I won't break my pick on the first ground, which is we think, based on the fact that he was an eyewitness to the events, that he was looking at Agent Astarita when the shots were fired, that he saw the muzzle flashes from Officer 1's rifle moments later when he fired the shots, that he was aware what the trajectory angles were that were being measured on the truck, that based on all of that body of knowledge in his 20-years-plus as a SWAT officer, we think he's qualified, under Rule 701 and 702, to offer that opinion.

But, second, Your Honor, the second ground that we argued, I think the Ninth Circuit has made clear that we should have some latitude to be able to explore the integrity of the investigation and whether this was a biased investigation. And the fact that he made this disclosure to the investigators while they were examining the truck, based on everything that he knew, I think we're entitled to explore what the

investigators and the forensics people -- what, if anything, did they do with that information?

And, interestingly, it's not even noted in the investigative reports. It fell out of the investigative reports that he made this disclosure to them. And so that's the second basis. Whether it's independently admissible as an opinion, I think we're entitled to explore what the investigators did, if anything, with this information when they received it.

And just to give Your Honor a little bit more background on this issue of the integrity of the investigation, there was a press conference that was held in March of 2016 before the grand jury ever even heard from a single witness in this case, and at that press conference the Deschutes County sheriff, who was leading this investigation, announced that he had concluded that an HRT agent is the one who fired the shot. And this was just weeks after Officer 3 had offered his opinion to the investigators.

And, subsequently, the grand jury proceeded and, to our knowledge, did not call a single Oregon State Police officer to testify in the grand jury. Not one. Again, notwithstanding the fact that this person who has been training with Officer 1 for the last ten years, or so, and has been a SWAT member for over 20 years offered his opinion.

So I apologize for the long lead-up, but --

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. ANGELI: The second basis we're offering this is on the issue of was this a fair and unbiased investigation.

THE COURT: All I can say is it confuses the issues. We're dealing with -- I'm not going to allow a lay opinion or expert opinion as to who -- as to this witness's conclusions. They will be excluded. That is a -- all my rulings today will be definitive unless I advise you to the contrary. So that's where we are.

The next defendant's -- the -- we're looking now at Defendant's Motion in Limine No. 120. By the way, I was referring to Officer 3 under No. 130 of the government's motions in limine.

I'm now turning to No. 120. Motion to exclude testimony overheard video regarding six missing shell casings.

Do you wish to speak to that?

MR. FRANCIS: Yes, Your Honor. Excuse me. Yes, Your Honor. Tyler Francis for Special Agent Astarita.

Your Honor, this is a completely uncontrolled scene. We have vehicles driving through, people walking all over, and plenty of people around during the daytime who would have been in a position to see anything like what the government is alleging happened here with these shell casings.

The government is arguing that evidence that someone concealed evidence is admissible to show consciousness of

guilt, and it sure is, but first you have to show that someone actually concealed evidence. They have no evidence, none, that Special Agent Astarita picked up any shell casings from that scene.

Instead of evidence of that, they want the jury to speculate that he did. And if they can't do that, they want to take a shortcut. They want to argue it doesn't matter who picked up the shell casings as long as it was someone from the FBI. So they want the jury to conclude, number one, that Special Agent Astarita knew that someone else from the FBI had picked these up and that he, quote, acquiesced to those actions and therefore can be held responsible for them. And, again, without any evidence, and, frankly, without support in the law.

They go hunting for case law to support this guilt by association notion, and the case they come up with is if a co-conspirator murders a witness, then the defendant loses his confrontation clause rights. That's a far cry from what's happening here. They couldn't find some shell casings that someone saw earlier, so, therefore, someone must have stolen them. The FBI is looking for gear that they dropped, so they must have picked up the shell casings, too, while they're at it. And Special Agent Astarita worked for the FBI, so he must be responsible for anything they do.

Even if they can't prove he actually did anything himself, that chain of inferences that's required to make this testimony

relevant is simply too attenuated and it should be excluded.

THE COURT: Your response?

MR. SUSSMAN: Well, those are their interpretations of the evidence, but the jury is entitled to draw its own interpretations and its own inferences from the evidence. And the evidence is this: There were shell casings on the roadway, and they were seen on the roadway in at least two different locations by several different officers or agents; and, yet, when they went to collect those shell casings from the roadway, they were gone. And some of the shell casings that disappeared, disappeared in an area right in front of a truck that was parked in the middle of the roadway, but into the southbound lane, that did not move at any time before the investigators got out there to look for those shell casings, in a place where there was no vehicular traffic going because of the truck being in the way, in a place where the only people on the scene were law enforcement officers.

This wasn't an uncontrolled scene where members of the public were coming in and coming out. That is a mischaracterization. This was a controlled scene where the only people present were law enforcement officers, and, frankly, once the two officers who had shot and admitted shooting were removed from the scene, there were very few Oregon state troopers there. They were there on the perimeter for scene security.

The people that were wandering around in the middle of this crime scene, tromping in and out of this unsecured crime scene, were HRT operators, and they can be seen on the overhead video bending over, picking things up, looking under vehicles, and all of this in an area where evidence from a crime scene was located.

They took that stuff. Those shell casings didn't pick up and walk themselves off the scene. They didn't go off the scene in car tire treads because there were no vehicles going through the area where at least some of those shells were seen. They disappeared because somebody picked them up.

That's the inference we're going to ask the jury to draw, and that's a permissible inference based on the evidence. And, for that reason, Your Honor, even though the agents may be able to offer a different explain, such as "We were looking for sensitive items" -- which, by the way, they didn't pick up and were recovered on the scene -- then, you know, that's an inference that they can raise, and that's an inference that the jury is free to either accept or reject. But the fact that there are alternative inferences available does not make the evidence of disappeared shell casings irrelevant or improper in this case.

THE COURT: Is there any evidence that the defendant picked up any of the shell casings?

MR. SUSSMAN: Defendant was one of the people seen on

the video wandering around in the crime scene. We also know 1 2 that --THE COURT: What's the answer to my question? 3 MR. SUSSMAN: Well, we can't see what was being 4 5 picked up because it's from the FBI video, but we know that he was looking in the -- he and the other HRT operators were 6 7 looking in the area where shell casings had been. THE COURT: Other HRT operators are not the 8 9 defendant. My question is directed at is there any evidence 10 that the defendant bent over or had anything to do with the shell casings? 11 MR. SUSSMAN: Well, we do know he was one of the 12 13 people out there picking stuff up and looking for stuff at the 14 scene at least, and we also know that --15 THE COURT: Now, you jumped two things. Is there any 16 evidence that he picked up any shell casings? Yes or no? 17 MR. SUSSMAN: Do I have a witness who says, "I saw 18 him pick up the shell casing"? The answer to that is no. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. SUSSMAN: But we do have every other operator who 21 was there expressly deny picking up shell casings, and we know 22 that defendant approached a fellow operator and said, "Hey, did 23 you see anything on the ground?" So we know he's looking for stuff on the ground. 24

THE COURT: Thank you.

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We're not going to unscramble what happened at the scene. What happened at the scene happened at the scene. It has some relevance, and the motion to exclude will be denied.

In respect to the next issue, motion to exclude Haag testimony, that the defense team sought to retain him, that has been agreed will not be brought up, unless, for some reason, on challenging Haag's qualifications, the defense opens the door for it. That will be granted.

Motion to exclude Piazza's testimony, that the defense law firm retained him in a previous case, the same ruling, that will be excluded, unless -- which is not going to happen -- the defense opens the door for that.

The next issue is to exclude the testimony from

Jeff Smith. There's been no offer from Catalin Grigoras, that

I know of, regarding the method of identifying gunshot sounds

on audio recording, and Terpstra's method in producing his 3D

model.

Would you like to speak to that?

MR. FRANCIS: Your Honor, I think we're closer on this issue than we were when we started. The government's response makes it clear that there -- they may call Professor Smith or Grigoras about other things they did besides vouching for what Mr. Terpstra did.

To the extent that's their testimony, that's not the subject of our motion. Our motion had to do with the subject

of Mr. Smith's testimony, similar to his testimony at the 1 2 Daubert hearing, that was primarily to vouch for Mr. Terpstra. THE COURT: Do you agree? 3 MR. MALONEY: We do, Your Honor. To the extent --4 5 and if we do feel that defense has opened the door to that topic, we'll certainly bring it up to the Court prior to 6 7 inquiry. THE COURT: The objection would be sustained. 8 Thank 9 you. 10 Motion to exclude testimony from those not present at the scene, narrating or commenting on what is depicted in the photo 11 12 or video exhibits. 13 We covered this in our previous hearing. What I'm trying 14 to communicate, we don't want to have some person who wasn't 15 there tell us what is there. What I expect that the government will have, you will have people state, "I was there. 16 17 me. That's the defendant. That's this. That's that." 18 Shawna Cox has been listed as a witness; is that correct? 19 MR. SUSSMAN: She is listed, Your Honor, yes. 20 Is she going to be called? THE COURT: 21 MR. SUSSMAN: Most likely not. 22 The issue, then, is to give continuity to THE COURT: 23 the government's case that it would be helpful to the jury as long as it's not offering evidence to simply introduce this is 24 25 the view from the fixed wings.

By the way, were they manned fixed wings or drones? 1 2 MR. SUSSMAN: They were manned aircraft, Your Honor. In fact, one of our witnesses is going to be one of the pilots 3 4 who shot the video. 5 THE COURT: He will be able to introduce the video that he shot. The Cox video, I assume, can be -- it's already 6 7 been stipulated --MR. SUSSMAN: Correct. 8 THE COURT: -- that she took the videos that are 9 10 offered, so all your -- the narration, I assume, would be just, "We are now showing X." 11 12 MR. SUSSMAN: Yes and no. It will not be an instance where we have someone narrating, "And this is Agent M and this 13 14 is Officer 3 and this is the defendant." That's not the 15 purpose of the narration. What we were talking about, Your Honor, is to bring out 16 17 certain details that might not be readily apparent to a casual 18 viewer. 19 To point out, for example --THE COURT: Who is on the witness stand? 20 21 MR. SUSSMAN: For example, with Frank Piazza, we can 22 have him testify that he located frames in which debris is 23 visible coming through the roof of the truck. Now, that's only a few fleeting frames, and that could easily be missed by a 24

casual viewer. He's seen that many, many times and has gone

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through it frame by frame, and he can point out the specific 1 2 frames and point out the debris coming through the roof. THE COURT: Have him do so. 3 MR. SUSSMAN: Right. That's the kind of narration we 4 5 were talking about, not a running commentary. On the infrared video, we were going to have someone talk 6 7 about what the infrared video characteristics are because it looks a little different than your classic video, and we were 8 going to talk about things like, you know, pointing out someone 9 10 bending over to pick something up or looking underneath a vehicle, things like that, that may be difficult to see. 11 12 THE COURT: Well, you would have a witness, though, 13 do that testifying. You know, "I was there. This is what I 14 see." I'm not sure that -- who is going to say that? Who is going to -- let's take Piazza. Is he going to say, "Please 15 notice that this officer is on his knees looking for 16 17 something"? 18 MR. SUSSMAN: Probably not. It would probably be our 19 case agent, Your Honor --20 THE COURT: Oh. 21 MR. SUSSMAN: -- who's seen that video hundreds and 22 hundreds of times. 23 THE COURT: I can't imagine, but close. All right.

MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: Your Honor, I think we're fairly

This is fairly innocuous.

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close with the government on this because the case law is clear that an agent who's watched the video numerous times can point out nuances that would be not caught by a casual observer. So, for example, the -- the described of it coming through the roof, what Frank Piazza testified, we don't object to that.

What we do object to is if it's visible on the video that somebody is bending down, the jury can see that someone is bending down, and the case agent is no longer offering helpful commentary. They're just offering running commentary on what's happening.

I think that that actually is the perfect distinction that the cases draw. The cases they cite of *Torralba-Mendia*, which we also set -- that sets forth this principle, and *Begay*, both involve the officers pointing out nuances in the video that are beyond what the jury would just see for themselves.

So while we think that they could have Frank Piazza testify that, for example, when the sparks come through, that's a nuance that the jury -- the jury wouldn't see on their own, they can't have a case agent say, "Now, look at the person bending down," because that's something the jury can simply see for themselves.

MR. SUSSMAN: But there may be other things, Judge, that the agent can point out to the jury that the jury wouldn't know.

THE COURT: Just ask the agent a leading question,

"Well, what do you make of this?" I don't know. It seems not prejudicial to anybody to just have a very brief continuity statement by the witness, and you can ask a leading question for clarification. Thank you.

MR. SUSSMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: We're not going to have somebody looking at all this and then have a running narration.

So the objection is sustained, essentially, that there won't be any continuous statement by someone who wasn't there as to telling us what's there. That can be done through witnesses.

The other thing is that the government is -- all you need is to have the evidence in evidence by the time of your closing argument. You have -- you'll be replaying the key stuff that you think is important, and you'll be able to make your own statement. "Now, look, this is what they're doing. This is what you should infer they're doing. This is what they're doing now." You will cover all of that.

MR. SUSSMAN: But there may be some things,

Your Honor, that I think the agent can testify to, that -- that
we would need the agent to testify to, such as, for example,
there are places in the video where you see what looks like
someone swinging a rifle back and forth, and you can't tell
what they're doing; but the agent, who's familiar with both
infrared videography and tactical operations, can say what

they're doing is they are combing the area with the flashlights on the end of their rifles, and the rifle is slung right-handed or the rifle is slung left-handed.

THE COURT: And that's typical. What I said is innocuous. That's fine.

MR. SUSSMAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Now, the next thing is about the shooting stance. Again, all we're talking about is someone saying, "He was holding a rifle like this." To say, "He's holding this like a shooting stance," well, where's the harm? You know, you can have the witness say, "He's holding it like this," or you can say "He's holding in a shooting stance," it doesn't seem like that's prejudicial and that it's -- so they can describe what they saw, and you can leave out "was this a shooting stance?" You could just say, "What did you see?" And we'll leave it at that.

So the answer is the witness can testify and physically describe what the stance was, but we'll leave out the, quote "shooting stance." Again, I think it's not necessarily helpful one way or the other.

The jurors will understand what the person's movements meant.

Motion to exclude testimony. Restrictions on the second interview. HRT operators. My ruling is that will be dismissed, and at the -- your request, and that the -- I want

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to make sure I say this correctly. It's still evidence that
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    the government can offer what he said, whatever the second
    interview was. Do you want to state that for the record?
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              MR. MALONEY: Your Honor, I think we're conflate --
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    we might have conflated two issues, and if we've confused the
    Court, we certainly apologize for that.
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              THE COURT: Maybe I'm confused. I should apologize.
    But, anyway, go ahead.
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 9
              MR. MALONEY: The second interview objection --
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              THE COURT: The one I want is the one you agreed to
    dismissal as long as you could show what was said.
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              MR. MALONEY:
                            These are the statements to Special
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    Agent -- Supervisory Special Agent IM.
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              THE COURT: Count what?
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              MR. MALONEY: Count 2, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT:
                          That's what I'm talking about.
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              MR. MALONEY:
                            Count 2 is different from the second
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    interview objection that counsel has brought.
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              THE COURT: Oh, wow. I am confused, then.
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    confusing -- I was addressing the second count.
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              MR. MALONEY: So as to the second count, we conferred
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    with defense counsel. We understand their concession now is
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    that those statements relating to defendant's statements to
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    Supervisory Special Agent IM are admissible and relevant to
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prove the other counts in the indictment.

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THE COURT: Right.

MR. MALONEY: Accordingly, the government will move to dismiss Count 2.

THE COURT: That's dismissed. Thank you.

All right. Now let's go back to motion to exclude testimony. The second interview.

MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: Your Honor, maybe I can clarify what this motion is. Before the second interview, there is evidence that the government will put on. It's contested, but the government will put on evidence that Special Agent Astarita and two other agents put certain conditions on their willingness to be interviewed.

THE COURT: Oh, okay.

MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: We don't contest that the government can put on evidence that they wanted to be interviewed in a group and that it be unrecorded. We're not challenging that evidence being admissible.

We did challenge whether or not they could get into the fact that Special Agent Astarita be asked to be represented by counsel at that interview, and the government has conceded they have no intention of bringing up that evidence.

THE COURT: Good.

MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: So the only issue still to be decided on this motion is whether they can bring out the fact that Special Agent Astarita asked that he not be asked

questions he had been previously asked without first being given the right to look at his previous statements, and we move to exclude that basically on pure relevance grounds and 403 grounds. It's simply not relevant because that right was afforded to every single law enforcement officer interviewed in this case. It's essentially a nonissue. Everyone was given that courtesy of being able to review their prior statements before being asked questions again. It's simply like asking to have heat on in the interview room. It's just not something that affects whether -- what happened in that interview, in terms of making it different from what the other interviews were in this case.

And the jury may infer some type of malintent or malfeasance in asking for it. And because the probative value is so low here, even that minor prejudicial value substantially outweighs the minor probative value here in this situation, and it should be excluded.

MR. MALONEY: Your Honor, the defense has made clear that they intend to challenge this as a biased and incompetent investigation. The conduct of the investigators, why they asked certain questions and didn't ask other questions is plainly going to be before the jury. The jury may well speculate that the -- the second interview was an incomplete interview and not know why the investigators didn't pose all these other questions to these witnesses collectively in this

group. We think that it is relevant. It is probative. 1 2 directly responsive to one of the attacks on the investigation. We ask that you deny the motion. 3 THE COURT: Anything further? 4 5 MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: I would just say that we don't intend to specifically attack whether or not they asked certain 6 7 questions in the second interview, and if we did open the door by raising such a specific question, then an answer like that 8 could come in, but it's not probative in the initial stance. 9 10 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. It's innocuous. It's not prejudicial to either side. It will be allowed. 11 12 So the motion is denied. 13 The motion to exclude reference to anonymous facts, that's 14 stipulated; is that correct? 15 MR. SUSSMAN: That is correct, Your Honor. We are 16 not planning to introduce any evidence on that. 17 THE COURT: That's granted. 18 Motion to exclude evidence that certain text and email 19 messages from HRT operators were not retained. 20 The government -- I have a note the government will elicit 21 testimony that the evidence is missing but will also make it 22 known that the failure to retain the messages is not attributable to the defendant or HRT. 23 24 Would you like to be heard?

MR. CARY: Yes, Your Honor. We're very concerned

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that that is prejudicial to Agent Astarita, that there will be some notion or inference that the jury may draw that that is some sort of conspiracy by the FBI, and in today's age, with all the accusations in the media about the FBI, we think it's very unfair, and we also think it's time-consuming and not something we ought to be wasting our time with.

THE COURT: I don't think it has any relevance to what we want. It will be granted.

Parties in the court --

MR. SUSSMAN: Your Honor, if I may, on that? Once again, we just heard counsel a moment ago talk about this being an incomplete and biased investigation.

THE COURT: I heard it, but I'm not buying it. We're not going into testimony that this is a biased investigation.

I will hear offers of proof and so forth. I have no intention of clouding up the great issue on this case. Did he fire the weapon? Did he lie about it? That's where we're going to keep it.

MR. SUSSMAN: I guess the government is concerned,
Your Honor, that the jury might be left wondering why didn't
they check his text messages? Why didn't they check his email
messages? We want to be able to tell them we tried.

THE COURT: They won't even get an opportunity to submit that to the jury.

So the parties and Court should not describe expert

witnesses as "expert." We've already covered that, but I -- we give the expert testimony and expert testimony instruction where you use the term "expert."

What I don't allow is to have a witness say, "Well, I was described as an expert by Judge Brown or Judge Simon or Judge So and So." That's not going to be allowed. But if the parties -- you know who you're calling as experts. You can refer to them, but that doesn't -- I'm not going to anoint -- tell them that they're an expert or that they're qualified to testify as a, quote, "expert." You won't hear that.

So that's granted to that extent.

Now, the questionnaire is resolved.

The next thing I have are exhibits. I have the government challenges to defense exhibits. How many exhibits is the government offering?

MR. SUSSMAN: Your Honor, I believe we have 263 exhibits on our exhibit list.

THE COURT: Thank you.

And the defense, roughly?

MR. FRANCIS: Your Honor, it's roughly -- it's roughly 900 or 1,000. But the vast majority of those are photographs. I would say 80 to 85 percent of those are photographs.

THE COURT: Well, they're still exhibits, but they -- so let's look at -- we'll go through.

Now, I hope I made it clear that at final pretrial conference we settle all exhibit issues. They are offered, and we don't -- if there's any question about authentication, it has to be done during final pretrial conference, not in front of the jury.

So I need to talk about what are the exhibits that are not going to be admitted.

Now, there was testimony -- there was objections that the defense was going to offer excerpts from 60 Minutes and from other videos and other media about the grueling training that these HRT operators go through. I now see that this has been reduced to nine still photographs demonstrating various HRT training exercises.

Now, first of all, we're not going to have portrayals -- and it's not even offered anymore -- about 60 Minutes and other matters of the HRT and their heroics and so forth.

I would assume the defense has considered -- I mean, the prosecution has considered, as to any objection, as to the training of the HRT, is that this may work in the government's favor because any trained HRT operator who's in a shooting environment is going to give a straightforward answer, not use ambiguous responses, and that they would automatically turn their weapons over for inspection if they are following their grueling training and their operation procedures.

But you're objecting to it, so let's clarify what you are

objecting to. 1 2 MR. SUSSMAN: Well, Your Honor, we're not objecting to testimony that HRT -- that the HRT selection process is 3 4 difficult and that they go through a tremendous amount of 5 training. What we do object to is exhibits showing people rappeling down the face of a waterfall, skydiving, people 6 7 standing around. THE COURT: Are these in the nine photographs? 8 MR. SUSSMAN: Yes, they are, Judge, and I can tell 9 10 you exactly which one it is. Defendant's 2336. They are rappeling down the cliff face of a waterfall. 11 12 I don't mean to interrupt. We can save MR. CARY: 13 everybody some time. We'll withdraw those nine exhibits. 14 THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you. 15 Now, we will have the Finicum truck here for the 16 government? 17 MR. MALONEY: Yes, Your Honor. We intend to use 18 that. 19 THE COURT: It will be down in the sallyport? 20 MR. MALONEY: Yes, Judge. Does the Court require an 21 order, to that effect, for a jury view? 22 THE COURT: I thought -- I don't require, but maybe I 23 should --24 MR. MALONEY: I can file a written motion requesting

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a jury view.

THE COURT: -- for the marshals. 1 2 Is the marshal going to bring it over? MR. MALONEY: No, Your Honor. I believe Deschutes 3 County Sheriff's Office is going to be conducting the 4 5 transport. THE COURT: Do you need anything further than my 6 7 order on the record? UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No, Your Honor. 8 MR. SUSSMAN: The only thing we're not sure of, I 9 10 quess, is whether the marshals will require the Court's authority. 11 12 I'll sign whatever is needed. THE COURT: MR. SUSSMAN: Thank you. 13 Your Honor, just for clarity's sake, those nine exhibits 14 15 are not the only ones the government is objecting to. I don't know when you want to take up objections to other exhibits. 16 17 THE COURT: I'll take any other objections the 18 government has to defense exhibits, yeah. 19 MR. SUSSMAN: All right. Well, there's a number of 20 them, and I don't know the easiest way do this, but I guess 21 we'll just go exhibit by exhibit. 22 As a general matter, the defense has marked as exhibits a 23 number of police reports. Now, we're in -- now, the authors of those reports are also on the defense's exhibit -- or witness 24

list, and some of them are also on the government's witness

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list.

Now, if those witnesses testify, of course, their reports would be cumulative to their testimony. So to the extent that the officers or agents testify to the matters in the reports, we would object to the reports as being cumulative under Rule 403.

In addition, there's some hearsay issues with them.

There's personal identifiable information in a number of them.

There's a lot of problems with a lot of these reports.

For example, we've got the improper opinion testimony which we continue to -- you know, with respect to Defendant's Exhibit 2002. That's Wes Murphy's report.

In 2004, there's a lot of personal identifiable information in there. There's also a complete list of all of the items of evidence seized by the Deschutes County Sheriff's Office. I'm not sure how that is relevant.

In 2005, Supplemental Report No. 1 contains hearsay.

2006 is okay, but it's probably cumulative if Deputy Zilk testifies.

2007, they've listed certain things as being redacted. We would need to see what the redactions are before we can --

THE COURT: Well, before we go further, have you met and conferred over these objections?

MR. SUSSMAN: Not specifically. No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, that's required. How many more do

you have? 1 2 MR. SUSSMAN: Quite a few. THE COURT: We're going to take our morning recess. 3 I'll require counsel to meet and confer, and we'll see where --4 5 what timing we have for that. MR. SUSSMAN: Okay. 6 7 THE COURT: But I try to make clear in final pretrial conference that you are to meet and confer over exhibits so 8 that I have a list of precisely what exhibits are offered and 9 10 whether you met and conferred and whether there was any objection; and, if so, the objections, so I can make a measured 11 12 I don't have that. response. 13 I'm getting something that a report may have hearsay. 14 Well, as you know, police reports can qualify as either 15 business records or as public records under 803.6 and 803.10. 16 And as far as evaluative reports as to what is admissible and 17 what is not, you are all very familiar with that. 18 So I'm going to need exhibits as to what you agree to and 19 what you don't agree to, and, I don't know, we might have to defer that until tomorrow. So we'll see. 20 21 We'll take a recess now for 15 minutes. 22 (Recess taken.) 23 THE COURT: Good afternoon. Have a seat. MR. ANGELI: Good afternoon, Your Honor. I'm pleased 24

to report some progress on the exhibits.

THE COURT: Fine. 1 2 MR. ANGELI: May I be seated to walk through some of this? 3 THE COURT: Please do. 4 5 MR. ANGELI: Okay. Your Honor, with respect to some of the defense exhibits, first, the defense has agreed to 6 7 withdraw certain exhibits, and, with the Court's permission, I'll walk through those. 8 THE COURT: Put them on the record. 9 10 MR. ANGELI: We've agreed to withdraw Exhibit 2004, 11 2010, 2012, 2016, 2017, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2036, 2046, 2048, 12 2066, and 2336 through 2344. We've also agreed, Your Honor --13 Exhibits 2028 through 2034 are learned treatises, and we've agreed that those exhibits themselves, pursuant to the rule, 14 15 will not go back to the jury but that we may read excerpts of them from the record, pursuant to the rule. 16 17 THE COURT: That's fine. 18 MR. ANGELI: We've agreed, Your Honor, to redact the 19 handwritten notes from Exhibits 2062 and 2063. 20 And then with respect to -- as Mr. Sussman was explaining 21 to the Court, many of our exhibits are police reports, and the 22 parties have agreed that those exhibits will come in but that 23 the defense will redact hearsay. So if the report says, "I

heard from Officer X" something, we'll redact the hearsay, and

we'll also redact any personal identifying information --

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telephone numbers, addresses, and the like -- for officers.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ANGELI: I think, Mr. Sussman, did I miss anything?

MR. SUSSMAN: Your Honor, just as a minor matter, there are some questions as to one of the exhibits. I think it may be 2044. I think the parties need to do a little bit more research into that. I think there may have been a page put in the wrong place.

There's also another exhibit that had a missing attachment that we're trying to run down.

And with respect to a couple of -- a couple of -- a couple of their exhibits, one is an analytical report from

Tori Dickerson, from the state police crime lab, which is their Exhibit No. 2056; and then there's also some field notes that she took that have been redacted as well. The parties have discussed the fact that the redactions have to do with the trajectory calculations that she did in this case. The defense redacted that because they felt compelled to do that in order to preserve their objections to the admissibility of that testimony.

However, we pointed out that if they seek to introduce those exhibits as currently redacted, that the government will be seeking to introduce the full unredacted versions under the rule of completeness.

THE COURT: Fine.

MR. SUSSMAN: And then, Your Honor, one other issue is with respect to Defense Exhibit 2051. That is the key, the code key, for the officers' names. That's going to have some redaction done to it. But the parties were discussing that it would be beneficial if there was a way that the key could go back to the jury without being a part of a publicly available record. I don't think the parties had an objection to the key going back so long as some of the reports that require it go back to the jury, but we're just concerned with maintaining officer confidentially in a broader, sort of, public context.

THE COURT: It will be retained as you suggest.

MR. SUSSMAN: I think that's it for the defense exhibits, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Now does that mean the remainder of the exhibits will be received without objection?

MR. SUSSMAN: Well, what we were talking about before Your Honor was -- we were going to suggest that the Court conditionally receive the exhibits, such that if they were actually used in connection with witness testimony, shown to a witness on the stand, then those exhibits that were used with a witness or shown to the witness while on the stand would go back to the jury; and if an exhibit was not used with or shown to a witness, then it would not.

THE COURT: We call that the Judge Marsh rule. He

kept a record once of all exhibits that had been received and nobody ever paid any attention to them or mentioned them again, so of course. That makes good sense, practical sense. If you're going to use it, fine; if you're not going to use it, then it doesn't go in.

MR. SUSSMAN: I mean, between the two of us, there's, what, 1,100 exhibits, almost 1,200 exhibits.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SUSSMAN: I don't think anybody is intending for that size of a pile to go back to the jury room.

THE COURT: All right. That's fine. Anything further on the exhibits?

MR. SUSSMAN: I was going to say not on the defense exhibits, I don't think; but there are some objections to, on the part of the defense, to some of the government's exhibits.

MR. FRANCIS: Thank you.

Your Honor, turning to the government's exhibit list, these fall under a couple of different categories, so I want to start with a number of objections that we have. We discussed -- everything I'm about to share with the Court we discussed with the government already.

These are objections that we have to the government's exhibits that we're making for reasons that we have already articulated in previous motions. The Court has ruled on these issues already. We're preserving our objection.

THE COURT: Yes. Well, the rulings that I made, you 1 2 don't have to raise again in front of the jury or even now, as far as the Daubert rulings; but as far as any rulings today, I 3 said they all will be definitive rulings. You don't have to raise them in front of the jury to preserve your record. 5 So that's where we are on what you have to object to to 7 preserve your record. MR. FRANCIS: Yes, Your Honor. What I'm specifically 8 doing is linking up those rulings to specific exhibits. 9 10 have specific objections. We have not made a record on our objections to these exhibits for the --11 12 THE COURT: Go right --MR. FRANCIS: -- reasons the Court has already 13 14

stated.

These are for -- these have to do with the Motion in Limine No. 1 from the defense, the shell casings issue.

> THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. FRANCIS: On that basis, we object to Exhibits 2 and 3, in part, to the extent that they're used to depict or argue anything regarding the missing shell casings issue that we were discussing this morning and also Exhibit 16, in its entirety, for the same reason.

> That's overruled, as I've stated. THE COURT:

MR. FRANCIS: As to certain exhibits being used in connection with Mr. Piazza, and this is Exhibits 6 through 15 and 17 through 20, we object to these documents for the reasons that we've stated in our *Daubert* motion against Mr. Piazza; namely, that these are enhanced videos with no record of what he did to these videos to enhance them.

THE COURT: I'll adhere to my prior ruling.

MR. FRANCIS: And to exhibits relating to
Victoria Dickerson, Exhibits 98, 99, and 100, we object to
these as they depict trajectory measurements using the
centering cone method for the reasons we articulated during the
Daubert hearing.

THE COURT: I reiterate my ruling.

MR. FRANCIS: As to exhibits pertaining to Michael Haag -- Exhibits 134, 138, 140, and 141 -- these exhibits all depict Haag's trajectories using the rocker method, and we object for the reasons previously stated.

THE COURT: Same rulings.

MR. FRANCIS: As to Mr. Turpen, Deputy Turpen,
Exhibits 129 through 132, we object to these exhibits for the
reasons we raised during the *Daubert* hearing and that
Mr. Turpen admits that his techniques meet literally none of
the *Daubert* factors.

THE COURT: Same ruling.

MR. FRANCIS: As to Mr. Terpstra, now, many of the government's exhibits, in general, fall into this category. We object to all of them for the reasons we articulated during the

Daubert hearing. Those exhibits are -- and I apologize. It's a lengthy list -- 36 through 46, 50 through 52, 165 through 167, 169 through 171, 173 through 175, 177 through 179, 181 to 184, 186 through 189, 191 through 193, 195 through 197, 199 through 202, and 204 through 246. So we object to all of those on the grounds that we previously argued during the Daubert hearing.

THE COURT: I adhere to my prior rulings.

MR. FRANCIS: Now, we have another set of issues with Terpstra's exhibits. These fall into a different category. We are seeking a ruling from the Court today on the issue I'm about to outline.

THE COURT: Fine.

MR. FRANCIS: These exhibits we strongly believe do not and, frankly, cannot comply with the Court's *Daubert* order that it did issue.

So this is the issue that we raised in our trial memo regarding exactly what the government is trying to do in response to the Court's *Daubert* order. We had some concerns about this based on what was produced to us during discovery by Mr. Terpstra after the *Daubert* order. And now that we've seen what has been designated on their exhibit list, we felt we needed to bring this to the Court's attention right away.

I brought some of these to show to the Court, which I think I'm set up here to do. It's a lot more helpful to show

you what it is we're talking about than to try to describe it 1 2 to you. THE COURT: I've been told that Terpstra has revised 3 his material. 4 5 MR. FRANCIS: He has done so, Your Honor. THE COURT: Is that what I'm looking at? 6 7 MR. FRANCIS: I'll be clear about what you're looking at, but a portion of what I'll be showing you are exhibits that 8 were designated by the government and that come from revised 9 10 work that Mr. Terpstra has done after the Daubert hearing. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Just so the record is clear on this, 12 MR. FRANCIS: 13 I'm going to be discussing one set of images, but the arguments 14 I'm making apply to an entire category of exhibits that are substantially similar. So I would like to talk about this set 15 16 as an example, and, then, at the end, I will go into detail 17 about exactly what exhibit numbers we feel suffer from the same 18 problem. 19 So, Your Honor, what I'm showing the Court now is from 20 Mr. Terpstra's original report prior to the Daubert hearing. 21 This is what they started with. 22 THE COURT: If you folks want to see these things, 23 you can go to the jury box and see it on the screens. I think it's set up, isn't it, Becky? 24 25 DEPUTY COURTROOM CLERK: It depends how they're

projecting it. 1 2 THE COURT: Maybe they're not interested. I don't know. 3 Don't be shy, folks. Just you came from -- you get up in 4 5 the jury box. Go on. Go on. Thank you. All right. 6 7 MR. FRANCIS: All right. THE COURT: This is a revised --8 9 MR. FRANCIS: No, Your Honor. This is what they 10 started with. This is what was in Mr. Terpstra's original report prior to the Daubert hearing. 11 12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MR. FRANCIS: This is what they want to show to the 14 This is Exhibit 214 from the government. This is 15 Exhibit 214, by comparison. They want to go from this, the 16 original exhibit, to this. 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 MR. FRANCIS: As a general matter, Your Honor, the 19 defense does not believe that this is in any way compliant with 20 the Court's order on what Mr. Terpstra is and isn't allowed to 21 do by placing individuals into this scene. 22 Going from this, which is the original lineup of people 23 from Mr. Terpstra's report, to this, which is 24 Government Exhibit 238, does not solve the problem and does not

comply with the Court's order that Mr. Terpstra's methodology

cannot accurately place the location of the individuals.

Taking their arms off and removing the legs of some people does

not solve the problem.

Now, this is Government Exhibit 30. This is a still frame from the FBI video. If they want to show this to a witness and have -- I'm going to zoom in on it here. If they want to show this zoomed-in version of Exhibit 30 to a witness and have them identify where they are in this picture --

THE COURT: We have to lower it.

MR. FRANCIS: I can't, unfortunately, Your Honor.

This is a screen -- a screenshot of it zoomed in.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FRANCIS: So if the Court will focus on this area, on this -- on this area right here and try to -- you know, we have the fuzzy splotches here, the fuzzy smudges, from the video. They don't want to show -- the government does not want to show this exhibit to the witness and have them show their location. They want to show this exhibit, which is a zoomed-in version of Exhibit 41, to a witness and have them -- take this image, which shows where Mr. Terpstra has placed these people, and have the witnesses identify which of these Mr. Terpstra positions corresponds to them.

THE COURT: Go back. The blue is defendant?

MR. FRANCIS: Correct.

THE COURT: Well, that --

MR. FRANCIS: It's, of course, not just --

THE COURT: Just leave it there for a minute. That can't be lowered?

MR. FRANCIS: I can zoom it out so we can see everything, Your Honor, and I have a picture that's going to get to that in a moment.

And I -- I'm focusing here on the other two individuals, besides the defendant, just -- just for clarity's sake.

Your Honor, it's not only the position of the defendant that is the issue here. It's the position of everyone who is -- who is in this scene.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.

MR. FRANCIS: So, again, the Court -- the Court's ruling, as we understand it, makes it clear that Mr. Terpstra can use camera matching and photogrammetry to place the vehicles. And if they want to overlay a trajectory even on top of that, that's coming out from Mr. Finicum's truck, that's fine too. That's in compliance with the Court's order. And then if they want to take a scene, if they want to zoom in on it and ask witnesses, "All right. Where were you at the time that Mr. Finicum got out of the truck?" and have them identify their positions in a scene like this that has Mr. Terpstra's 3D vehicles, that's one thing; but to start with their finger on the scale by having Mr. Terpstra place those people into the positions that Mr. Terpstra believes that they are using camera

matching and photogrammetry, we do not believe that that is in compliance with the Court's order.

Our understanding of what they want to do here is to take an image like this and show it to the jury and show it to the witness, have the witness identify, "Hey, where are you in this image?" A better example of a leading question, I cannot think of, because they've already placed the people into this image before they show it to a witness. The witness is going to, I guess, bless where these people are, and eventually they're going to come up with an image that looks like this.

This is Government's Exhibit 41, with Mr. Terpstra's positions for each of these people as Mr. Terpstra placed them. Just having a -- showing this to a witness and having a witness say, "Yep, looks good to me," does not address the Court's concern that Mr. Terpstra's methodology cannot accurately place the location of the vehicles. There's the reason -- "of the people." Excuse me. I said "of the vehicles."

Now I want to talk about why this is a problem. We're not just fighting about how someone can indicate people on this video what shape of circle or what color of circle they used. The question is who gets to place these people and what does Mr. Terpstra get to say to the jury about what those positions mean? What they want to do is have Mr. Terpstra place the people and then testify that those are the true, correct, and accurate positions of those people.

People that were placed using photogrammetry and camera matching, that's exactly what this Court said they weren't allowed to do. Only by taking the position of these people as accurate, is Mr. Terpstra then able to throw them into his model and move the camera around so he can show the jury pictures like this -- this is Government Exhibit 243 -- or this, Government Exhibit 241; or this, Government Exhibit 240.

There are no photographs like this. There is not even a fuzzy smudge that corresponds with this angle or the previous one, 241, or the previous one, 243. There's no video frame, fuzzy smudge, or otherwise, that shows anything from this angle. This is entirely computer generated.

You can't generate this image unless Mr. Terpstra is permitted to use camera matching to, quote, accurately place the location of the individuals into his model. Again, that's exactly what the Court said he couldn't do.

If you want to switch views, switch positions, get away from the ariel overhead FBI plane view and switch to a top-down view, for example, or an over-the-shoulder view, the only way to do that is to do something like this. This is Exhibit 237.

Now, this does comply with the Court's order. This is, again, a view that doesn't exist anywhere in photography.

There is no video frame that shows this image. This is also entirely computer generated. But unlike the other images I've shown you already, this only has the trajectory and it only has

the trucks. That complies with the Court's ruling.

If they want to show this to a witness and have them draw an X, "I was here," illustrate their testimony by saying, "I started out over here and then I moved in some fashion as things developed," that would be one thing; but they want to show this picture to the jury instead: Exhibit 245.

Again, this has Mr. Terpstra's positions for these people, not the positions that these eyewitnesses would place themselves in, and we know exactly what the government wants Mr. Terpstra to say about this from their trial memo.

The government's trial memo, on page 13, "Mr. Terpstra," quote, "applied camera matching photogrammetry techniques to position the vehicles, personnel, and trajectory measurements."

Further down the page, quote, "Mr. Terpstra created visualizations to illustrate the movements and the positions of the people."

Finally, quote, "The model clearly shows that the defendant is the only person within the point of origin for the bullet that caused impact W."

That is not illustrating the testimony of an eyewitness, which the Court said the government could do, but that is Mr. Terpstra purporting to testify that his methodology can accurately place the location of the individuals. That is precisely what the Court said he couldn't do. That's the only way that Mr. Terpstra can say, "I know who is in the cone and

who is not in the cone."

As I said, Your Honor, I've shown one sequence of -- I've shown a sample of images. I have a list I can share with the Court as we move further into this argument of all of the exhibits that are infected with this same problem.

THE COURT: Let's stop here and have the government's response.

MR. MALONEY: Yes, Judge. If we could -- if we can take control.

Judge, what the government attempted -- the government did was, in an effort to comply with the Court's order and to address some of the issues that came up with Mr. Terpstra's testimony during the *Daubert* hearing, was to take multiple frames from the FBI overhead video and apply those camera matching techniques, the same ones that Mr. Terpstra testified to during the *Daubert* hearing, to multiple frames of video, all surrounding the time of shot "W" as identified by Mr. Frank Piazza.

So what you see here, Your Honor, in the side-by-side view on your viewer screen, is Government Exhibit 26 and 37.

Government 26 is the overhead video. Government 37 would be an exhibit that will help the -- help the jurors understand the scene, help the witness to be able to demonstrate and illustrate their testimony as to who was positioned where. The witnesses will be asked whether that is fair and accurate to

their recollection of the positions of the individuals at the time that Mr. Finicum got out of his truck.

As the Court saw throughout the *Daubert* hearing, this whole incident took place in those seconds as Finicum got out of the truck, and that's what we've tried to capture here.

The next file in sequence.

So that was 26 and 37.

Here should be 27 and 38. You'll notice the figures have moved further along the timeline of events. Again, this is going to be used to demonstrate and illustrate the movement of the individuals at or near the time Mr. Finicum got out of his truck. The colors are being applied so that it is clearer so that the individuals can identify themselves and, to the extent that they are able, to identify the other operators present and moving through the scene.

Next figure, please.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MALONEY: We have a whole sequence of these. So we're showing multiple things with this and demonstrating not only just where they were at a certain point in time, but the sequence demonstrates the movement through the scene, which is probative and illustrative to the witness's testimony, and these images help to explain their testimony and make things clearer for the jurors.

Then we have Mr. Terpstra testify later in the case to

explain both the vehicles and the camera matching technologies that he used for the placement of the vehicles and the trajectories. And to the extent that the witnesses are able to identify where they were in the frames that we've demonstrated for the Court, Mr. Terpstra will explain how he was able to create these images that are in 26 and -- 26 and 37, 27 and 38, and pair those images for the jury to explain what the 3D model was able to create in terms of the demonstrative evidence.

If the Court is convinced that the government has met its burden by a preponderance that we have now demonstrated that the images from the 3D model and the 3D model are relevant and reliable, we would ask the Court to reconsider the *Daubert* hearing in light of the new eyewitness testimony and to admit those exhibits.

In the absence of that, we still are within the ruling of the Court to use those as demonstrative aids with the witnesses, to explain how they -- how these images were generated within the 3D model, and to show Mr. Terpstra's manner in which he placed them.

I agree with counsel insofar as if the witnesses can't say that that is fair and accurate to where they were, that Mr. Terpstra's model would be limited to just the vehicles and the trajectories. But there's a critical component that we're trying to harmonize with the Court's previous ruling, and that is factoring in the eyewitness testimony.

We believe that these exhibits help demonstrate and illustrate their testimony and will be helpful to the jury in that regard. To the extent the government has laid sufficient foundation for admissibility based upon Mr. Terpstra's testimony and the testimony of the eyewitnesses, we would ask the Court to consider admitting them all in full. In any event, we can still use them, in part, as demonstrative evidence.

THE COURT: All right. In respect to this matter, you can still use the left screen and have the witness identify, "Can you find yourself on this screen?" The witness find on the stand. And I assume that in preparation for the testimony, that you can use anything to refresh memory. If you remember what we used to say, you can use a ham sandwich to refresh memory.

Anyway, the -- so you start with the one on the left and say, "Please mark where you were, if you know, on that screen," and I assume the witness will be able to do that. If so, all they have to do is circle it. On the other hand, if your witness breaks down, then I have -- I think it might be -- I think it's a close question as to whether you can show them the right screen and say, "Does that refresh your memory?" And at that point they can say, "Yeah, that's me." That is now verified. It's not Terpstra. It's now verified as to whether they can identify where they are.

But it will not come in as Terpstra saying this is X, Y, 1 2 Ζ. Is that clear? MR. FRANCIS: That makes sense to us, Judge. 3 THE COURT: Fine. 4 5 MR. MALONEY: Just so the -- are we able to use the right-hand screen with the witness? 6 7 THE COURT: Not unless -- you start off, you'll use the left-hand screen. The witness should be, with proper trial 8 preparation, be able to identify themselves. "Would you please 9 10 just use your finger and circle where you are on that screen?" And that's all you need. 11 The position of the vehicles -- trucks, cars, et cetera --12 are not in dispute. 13 So if they can't do that, then -- I'm considering it --14 15 you put the other screen up and say, "Does that refresh your 16 memory?" But "Where were you?" and not "Is that you?" 17 MR. MALONEY: Understood, Your Honor. 18 MR. FRANCIS: Your Honor, if I could make a clear 19 record, since we're referring to the left side and right side 20 of the screen here? So the left side of the screen, which, as 21 we're currently looking at it, is Government's Exhibit 28, this image and the other images similar to it, we have not objected 22 23 to any of those exhibits. 24 THE COURT: Right. 25 MR. FRANCIS: The image on the right side --

THE COURT: Would you give us the number?

MR. FRANCIS: That's Government Exhibit 28.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. FRANCIS: The image on the right side of the screen currently displayed is Government's Exhibit 39. That image is -- just to describe it, is the view from the FBI video with Mr. Terpstra's trucks and outlines overlaid on top of it.

As I indicated a few moments ago, Your Honor, I have a list of all the government's exhibits which are similar to the right side of the screen which use these outlines. Those exhibits are Exhibits 36 through 46, 50 through 52, 208 through 222, 223 through 236, portions of a video marked as Government's Exhibit 207, and Exhibits 239 through 246.

THE COURT: Thank you. So I hope that we now -- the preference, to keep this accurate, is to have the witness take the original exhibit and circle where they were or where anybody else was. It might take two or three witnesses to identify people. If that doesn't work, you can use the other one to refresh memory to see if they have it, and you just ask the question, "Does that refresh your memory?" And if so, "Where were people, if you know?" And they can verify it that way. But it's not coming in as Terpstra's interpretation of where they were. That's his credibility. We have to have the witness's credibility at stake. That's what it is. I don't think we need to discuss that further.

MR. FRANCIS: Thank you, Your Honor.

I have several final matters as regards to the government's exhibit list.

Exhibit 134, we raised a different objection to this earlier, but we also object to Exhibit 134 on the grounds that it represents Michael Haag's entire report. Mr. Haag will testify his report is hearsay.

I don't know if we want to --

THE COURT: Do you have a response?

MR. MALONEY: Judge, you know, we're in a spot where we're putting in all kinds of different expert reports. We thought that -- the government's position was if Ms. Dickerson's report is coming in, in part, but then eventually it's going to come in under the rule of completeness, Mr. Haag's report, as it dovetails off of hers, takes her information and refines it, would be admissible to explain that.

We can do it through his testimony. We just thought that was going to be a cleaner way to do it so that the jury wouldn't have questions, in their mind, as to why we have reports from one expert and not the other.

THE COURT: So what's before the Court?

MR. FRANCIS: Your Honor, Victoria Dickerson's report, as we've -- as we've offered it, doesn't contain any expert testimony in it. It's her observations and her

measurements. 1 2 THE COURT: Measurements, right. MR. FRANCIS: Right. Her observations and the 3 measurements, to the extent they're not -- they don't require 4 5 her expertise. So our position is still that Mr. Haaq's report is hearsay. And if they're going to put that on, they need to 6 7 put it on through his testimony. Well, Haag will be testifying about the 8 THE COURT: contents of his report, won't he? 9 10 MR. MALONEY: He will, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: And then his report would be cumulative. MR. MALONEY: As would Ms. Dickerson's. 12 13 THE COURT: Yes. So the testimony is what counts. 14 Not the reports that they had made for pretrial discovery or 15 for the Daubert hearing. So the reports -- if there's an 16 objection to the reports themselves, they don't come in. 17 can't tell what you've agreed to and what you haven't at this 18 point. 19 I'll ask the defense which reports do you admit should 20 come in as helpful and which ones do you object to as 21 cumulative?

MR. ANGELI: Your Honor, we don't think any expert reports should come in. And the document of Ms. Dickerson's that we offered is not her expert report. Before she offered any expert opinions in this case, she was an investigator.

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THE COURT: The reports generally do not come in. 1 2 It's the testimony that comes in. MR. ANGELI: We agree, Your Honor. We haven't 3 offered any expert reports. 4 5 THE COURT: So my ruling is the reports do not come It's the testimony that the people have, not their 6 7 reports. That's where we are. 8 Okay. MR. FRANCIS: Your Honor, the last issue we have to 9 10 deal with is Mr. Bundy's medical records and photos of Ryan Bundy in the hospital. The government has marked as an 11 12 exhibit the entirety of Ryan Bundy's medical records. absolutely no reason these need to be shown to the jury. 13 14 THE COURT: Well, the photo of his wound is, though. MR. FRANCIS: The photo of his wound is? 15 THE COURT: Admissible. 16 17 MR. FRANCIS: Your Honor, with respect, we disagree. 18 There is no dispute that someone fired a round into the roof of 19 Finicum's truck and that that round made a bullet hole in the 20 roof of the truck, broke the window, and caused something to go 21 flying into Mr. Bundy's shoulder. We would stipulate to all of 22 There's no reason for the government to literally wave that. 23 the bloody shirt and show photos like --24 The photograph is relevant evidence. THE COURT: Ιt

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will be received.

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MR. FRANCIS: Your Honor, there's a sequence of
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    photographs that they designated.
              THE COURT: One.
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              MR. FRANCIS: They get one?
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              THE COURT: One photograph of the wound. No medical
    report.
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 7
              MR. FRANCIS: Your Honor, the parties have agreed
    that CVs for expert witnesses will not be admitted.
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                                                         We did not
    designate any on our -- on our exhibit list.
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              THE COURT: The witness can briefly describe their
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    background. We have one CV that was 72 pages long.
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    amazed. But, yeah, the CVs, you can either -- you can do it
    two ways. You can have a one-page report, a CV, that
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    highlights their background. We don't need how many speeches
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15
    they gave to where and when and how many training missions did
                 That's not helpful. In fact, it's the opposite.
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    they go to.
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         So let me suggest that you have a mini CV for each of the
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    experts. So I'll save you from trying to agree to it all.
19
    I'll so order it.
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              MR. FRANCIS: That's fine, Your Honor. Your Honor,
    we separately agreed that the CVs would not come in.
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22
              THE COURT: Well, I think a mini CV is fine. That's
23
    helpful for the jury to remember.
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         That's okay with you?
              MR. MALONEY: Yes, Your Honor. If I could, could we
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briefly revisit the Bundy medical record issue? 1 2 THE COURT: What's in there? MR. MALONEY: There's a narrative from Mr. Bundy, his 3 chief history of complaint, where he recounts how he was 4 5 injured. We'd like to admit that. THE COURT: That goes to a fact issue. It doesn't go 6 7 into how his wound would be treated. MR. MALONEY: Your Honor, we also would like to admit 8 the portions where the doctor evaluated that injury and 9 10 determined that it did not need to be removed. That goes to explain why the government does not have possession of that 11 12 evidence. We would also like to admit the radiograph image of 13 the 1.4 centimeter metallic object that is in Mr. Bundy. 14 think that explains the nature and the scope of the material 15 that is in his body. And also --16 THE COURT: What do you claim it is? 17 MR. MALONEY: Judge --18 THE COURT: It's not a bullet. It's a fragment? 19 MR. MALONEY: I can't say whether it's a fragment of 20 the bullet or --21 THE COURT: But what -- excuse me. I don't mean to interrupt you. Go ahead. 22 23 MR. MALONEY: I cannot explain to the Court whether 24 it's a fragment of a bullet. I can't explain to the Court

whether it's a fragment of the roof or some other object of

debris that impacted him. We know he stated in the video that he got hit. We know that he was on scene and refusing medical treatment. We know that the defendant was interacting and one of the arresting officers with Mr. Bundy at the scene. We will prove, through witness testimony, that he actually moved Mr. Bundy's cowboy hat from his head. Those facts are determinative to the circumstances under which the shots were fired and when the defendant learned that the occupants in the vehicle were injured and potentially injured as a result of his shooting. We believe that that could -- that the jury could infer from that that it's at that point that Mr. Astarita determined that he needed to pick up brass and he needed to deny that he shot.

Those facts --

THE COURT: Wait a minute. What's that last statement? It's relevant to Astarita's state of mind about what?

MR. MALONEY: To Astarita's knowledge as to when occupants of the vehicle reported being injured by gunfire. That Mr. Bundy was reporting that he got hit and injured. When FBI went to treat him, he refused treatment and wanted to transported to medical. This is the medical treatment that he received.

THE COURT: So what has that got to do with the shooting?

MR. MALONEY: It goes to show when Mr. Astarita 1 2 learned that he had -- that he had injured someone inside the truck. 3 THE COURT: So what? 4 5 MR. MALONEY: That's why he went to pick up shell casings and one of the reasons why he denied -- he denied the 6 7 shooting. It's against FBI policy to shoot into a vehicle. THE COURT: Oh? That's the first time I've heard 8 9 that. Do you have proof on that? 10 MR. MALONEY: We will have witnesses and agents testify that FBI policy is not to shoot into a vehicle. 11 12 policy is to shoot armed suspects or a driver of a vehicle. 13 THE COURT: And those would be reasons why he did not 14 report it? 15 MR. MALONEY: That's a reasonable inference that the jury could draw. Yes, Your Honor. 16 17 THE COURT: Your response? 18 MR. FRANCIS: Your Honor, the problem with that is --19 I want to link this back up to the exhibit we're actually 20 talking about, which is the medical records. There's no 21 evidence that Special Agent Astarita is aware of the medical 22 records themselves. What the evidence they're talking -- they 23 want to put on evidence about what Special Agent Astarita

actually knew based on what he observed back on the scene,

that's one thing; but this medical record is taken at the

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hospital where there's no evidence that the defendant knew 1 2 anything about -- about what happened at the hospital or that, in fact, when he's complaining that he got shot he actually got 3 Their stated reason why this is relevant doesn't 4 5 actually link back up to the defendant at all. THE COURT: The ruling of the Court is definitive. 6 7 The photograph of the wound will be admitted. The remainder of the medical report is not relevant to the issues in this case. 8 MR. FRANCIS: Finally, Your Honor, the parties have 9 10 agreed that Government Exhibit 16 -- we've objected to this on 11 other grounds. Not -- without waiving that objection, this 12 exhibit can be shown as a demonstrative but will not go back to 13 the jury. THE COURT: That's which one? 14 15 MR. FRANCIS: This is Government Exhibit 16. THE COURT: Which is what? 16 17 MR. FRANCIS: Your Honor, I'll play it on the screen. 18 So this is a portion of the overhead video with a red 19 circle drawn around an individual that tracks this individual's 20 movements throughout the duration of the roughly 21 eight-and-a-half-minute video. 22 THE COURT: What is wrong with that? MR. FRANCIS: Your Honor, our issue is with the 23

circle. We don't think that should go back to the jury. If

they want to use that as an aid -- in an aid of testimony,

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that's one thing. The government has agreed with this, and they do not intend to send this back to the jury.

THE COURT: Do you agree?

MR. MALONEY: We would prefer to have this as an exhibit. We think it's helpful to the jury. But it is a mod -- it is an enhancement that Mr. Piazza did to a video that's already in evidence, so we're happy to play it as a demonstrative and leave if at that if that's the Court's ruling.

THE COURT: Leave it as demonstrative.

MR. FRANCIS: Your Honor, that is it when it comes to the exhibits.

I have one other issue I wanted to raise to the Court while I still have the microphone, and it pertains to Mr. Turpen.

The Court may have -- we raised this argument in our trial brief as well, but understanding the Court's position, as articulated in the *Daubert* opinion, but I think it's worth pointing out that Mr. Turpen, indisputably, also relied on the same fuzzy smudges that Mr. Terpstra was using in order to place the people in his diagrams as well. He relied on nothing more than that. He had no other information that he was relying on that Mr. Terpstra did not have access to. So we're simply asking for consistency that Deputy Turpen's diagrams also be subject to the limitation that they can only place the

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location of individuals to the extent that eyewitness testimony
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    can put them there.
              THE COURT: What are we talking about? What exhibit?
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              MR. FRANCIS: Your Honor, this encompasses
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    Exhibits 129 through 132, as well as the testimony that would
    go along with them.
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              MR. ANGELI: We'll get them up for you in just a
    moment, Your Honor.
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 9
              THE COURT: Okay.
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              MR. FRANCIS: It will be this exhibit and one similar
    to it, Your Honor.
11
                          Well, the officer is going to be here.
12
              THE COURT:
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              MR. FRANCIS: Yes.
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              THE COURT: He will be testifying.
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              MR. FRANCIS: Yes.
                                   That officer is not an eyewitness
    to any of the events that he's depicting in this diagram.
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17
              THE COURT:
                          This deals only with the placement of the
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    cars?
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              MR. FRANCIS: Of the individuals, Your Honor.
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    concern --
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              THE COURT: Oh, I see what you now -- what you're
    talking about, yeah.
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              MR. FRANCIS: Your Honor, what we would be seeking is
    something similar to what the Court has already articulated for
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    Mr. Terpstra. If Deputy Turpen wants to put this diagram up or
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if the government wants to put this diagram up with just the cars and the trajectory and have people identify where they were, fine.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. FRANCIS: But having Deputy Turpen place them based on his viewing of the video and his viewing of the same fuzzy smudges --

THE COURT: I would have to have assurance from the government that you would have a witness who would verify the position of these people, and you're in a position to do that, I think.

MR. SUSSMAN: Well, first of all, Your Honor, this was the subject of litigation at the *Daubert* hearing, and the Court's ruled that this is admissible as it is. It's already that -- that's the Court's ruling, and that's in the order.

Second, Deputy Turpen described in some detail how he placed those people there with reference to fixed objects, the locations of which he knew, such as the corner of the vehicle, the wheel of the vehicle, the centerline, the fog line, things like that. But I anticipate that we would have the same witnesses who would be able to identify themselves in the FBI video would be able to place themselves on these diagrams as well.

THE COURT: I thought that was my statement, is you're going to have witnesses that can verify this, their

position. 1 2 MR. SUSSMAN: I presume so. With the exception of the blue figure, who's Agent Astarita, who, of course, we can't 3 put on the stand to have him verify anything for us. 4 5 THE COURT: But the other people can tell where he 6 was. 7 MR. SUSSMAN: I would anticipate so, yes. THE COURT: Promise we have somebody to authenticate 8 these people either -- I don't know what the sequence is, 9 10 whether you're going to call Dickerson, Turpen, et cetera, or the other way around. As long as I have your assurance I'll 11 have an independent witness to identify from that exhibit where 12 13 those -- who those people were and where they were at that 14 time, that's all the Court wants. 15 I would just trust the prosecution to assure the Court 16 that that's going to happen. That's all we need. MR. SUSSMAN: Well, then you have my assurance 17 18 because, if we can't -- if we can't establish it, obviously 19 we're not going to put that up there. 20 THE COURT: All right. Perfect. 21 MR. FRANCIS: Understood. THE COURT: Okay. Anything further? 22 23 MR. CARY: Your Honor, one relatively minor thing on exhibits, and that is we had understood that the exhibit 24

labels -- that we were using different number sets so that

there would be one joint set of exhibits and not government 1 2 exhibits. THE COURT: I thought that was settled? 3 MR. CARY: We've done that. But the government has 4 5 "government" exhibit labels on their exhibits. Ours simply say "exhibit." And I know it sounds minor, in some ways, but 6 7 there's a traditional jury instruction that's given to address the prejudice that one might have by there being different 8 labels, like the government owns those exhibits, and we would 9 10 ask that all the exhibits say -- simply say "exhibit" on them, not "government exhibit." And ours say "exhibit." 11 12 THE COURT: Who is going to change the labels? 13 MR. CARY: They're electronic, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Well, I thought you had an agreement with 15 Becky that we just have the numbers and not who offered them. 16 A lot of them are -- could be offered by either side. 17 So any problem with that? 18 MR. SUSSMAN: Your Honor, we're a week away from 19 trial now. 20 THE COURT: What? 21 MR. SUSSMAN: We're just a week away from trial now, 22 and I think it would be a little unseemly at this point to ask us to relabel all of our exhibits. We've got the burden of 23 proof here, and I don't see what the problem is with calling an 24

exhibit Government's Exhibit 1, Defense Exhibit 2000.

THE COURT: All I ask, I thought you had -- that you 1 2 folks had agreed to just have them numbered without who offered them. But, traditionally, if you marked them, you've offered 3 them. We call it your exhibit -- whatever they marked. 4 5 So considering the number of exhibits -- how many do you have? 6 7 MR. SUSSMAN: Well, with the removal of the CVs, we're probably down to around 250. I would guess somewhere 8 thereabouts. 9 10 THE COURT: You have a thousand? MR. CARY: Yes, Your Honor. All which simply say 11 "exhibit." 12 THE COURT: I don't think changing who offered the 13 14 exhibit is going to make any difference to the jury at all. 15 Counsel can explain to the jury that many of these exhibits were for both sides. The simple thing would be just 16 17 to change your stickers. 18 MR. CARY: We understand it's an electronic process, 19 Your Honor. THE COURT: I didn't know that. Is that true? 20 21 MR. SUSSMAN: Where they're being presented electronically, I believe that is correct, Your Honor. 22 23 THE COURT: Well, let's just keep it -- just it'll be your exhibits. We'll take off the "government." Defense 24 25 hadn't labeled theirs, so we just have exhibits. And even

mine, you don't have -- may I have your attention? Can I hear directly from your -- you can speak into the mic, please. No. Sit down and speak into the mic.

MS. HARRIS: Your Honor, I approximate about a day of my work because I have to remove the annotations and reapply them.

THE COURT: I just changed my mind. We're not going to fiddle around with -- this is minutia. Not having to do with anything the jury is going to do. Just leave them as it is.

My, what overwhelming argument that was.

All right. Now, the next thing is that I have the witnesses. We have David Klinger. I already expressed that I'm concerned because he was not offered at the *Daubert* hearing. The defense did put on their statistician, so I don't know why Klinger wasn't put up at that time. I also am concerned that without some issue being raised by anybody that they don't have a present memory of what shots were fired except, I think, one witness said he wasn't sure.

So do you want to state on your case for Klinger?

MS. FERGUSON: Yes, Your Honor. Meghan Ferguson, speaking for the defendant, with respect to the issue of Dr. Klinger's proposed --

THE COURT: By the way, good luck.

This is -- she's going for surgery. This is Edie Greene's

sister. Edie Greene was the co-author with Elizabeth Loftus, and sometimes Geoffrey, and a whole spew of these forensic psychologists, of which Klinger is also. So all I can say is that when we got into the eyewitness testimony, which these were famous for, the unreliability, the psychologists would talk generally about there's an issue in this case about the reliability of eyewitness testimony, but they would not check the individuals that were involved in the bank robbery or the assault and so forth.

I understand that you're trying to put Klinger in that slot, in that posture; but, in this case, other than one witness saying, "I'm not sure how many rounds I fired," I haven't heard any evidence that there's going to be a question of someone being traumatized to the point they can't remember even firing a weapon.

So you've got my somewhat biased opinion.

Go ahead.

MS. FERGUSON: Yes, Your Honor.

Special Agent Astarita's ability to present a complete defense, including the proposed testimony of Dr. Klinger, implicates his Fifth Amendment right to due process and his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel and the basic fairness of this trial. And the Court is correct in that Dr. Klinger's testimony will not be offered to prove that any specific officer on the scene experienced sensory

distortions or memory gaps; but it will be helpful to the jury, however, for Dr. Klinger to explain for jurors who may be unfamiliar with these phenomenon that are commonly experienced by officers, to explain how it is possible that each of the three potential shooters on that roadway may each sincerely believe that he did not fire shots four and five. It is important for the defense to be able to demonstrate this and for Dr. Klinger to be able to explain his research to jurors who may be totally unfamiliar with the kinds of distortions and recall issues that -- that the -- that his research and other research demonstrates that officers do commonly experience in these kinds of events.

And your -- the Court mentioned expert testimony regarding eyewitness identifications. The Ninth Circuit has also, in the context of child sexual abuse victims, allowed experts to testify generally without conducting specific interviews of parties involved in those cases regarding scientific studies that point to general characteristics that can be experienced by victims that would help to explain, for example.

THE COURT: In all those cases, the child was shown not to be able to articulate what happened.

Is there any showing in this case that any of these officers are unable to articulate what happened?

MS. FERGUSON: I think the evidence will show, for example, Your Honor, that there are, on the part of officers,

an inability to recall having fired. All of these officers -THE COURT: Any one of the three?

MS. FERGUSON: Well, each of the three officers have denied taking shots four and five, and so, therefore, do not recall taking shots four and five. And at least one of the officers who took multiple shots, I believe, wasn't able to specifically recall the precise number of shots that he did take.

THE COURT: I remember that one, yeah.

MS. FERGUSON: And Dr. Klinger's research does speak to the specific issue of round count. His research shows that officers are often unaware of how many rounds they fired and often undercount their rounds when they fire multiple shots.

His research also does indicate examples of officers who were not aware, at the moment they pulled the trigger, that they were pulling the trigger, and it was only after external cues basically told them "I must have pulled the trigger" that they realized that.

In this case, we don't necessarily have external cues.

THE COURT: All right. Anything further?

MS. FERGUSON: No, Your Honor.

Oh, sorry. With respect to the timing, the defense has already indicated, in correspondence with the Court, that we did not understand the Court's order from October of 2017 to impose a requirement of simultaneous expert disclosure. We do

not believe Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 contemplates simultaneous disclosure.

THE COURT: Well, I can tell you this: I have done dozens, if not hundreds, of *Daubert* evaluations. We always do them together. It's a pretrial matter. At the same time. Not necessarily that -- when I say "together," that they can testify separately, but we clear the expert *Daubert* issues in -- that are going to come into trial. So when you say the rule doesn't contemplate it, well, the practice certainly does, and so that's where we are.

I would prefer to not have an issue come up, with respect to counsel, to think that you didn't have to disclose your expert witnesses for the *Daubert* week we set aside, so I'm trying to avoid that issue. But let's hear from the defense -- I mean, the prosecution.

MR. SUSSMAN: Well, in terms of timing, Your Honor, they've known from the outset what this case is about. It's been going for a long time. And we served them with a discovery request way back in February where we asked for expert discovery. They didn't give us anything. They told us they would give it to us along with their Daubert motion, and the discovery we got with the Daubert motion were just the witnesses we heard from at the Daubert hearing.

And we didn't learn until just three weeks before the trial about a criminologist and about a psychologist, who they

have since said will not be testifying, and about their new statistician, who is different than the one that testified at the *Daubert* hearing.

We also heard for the first time about their mechanic, but that is something that arose for the first time at the *Daubert* hearing. We don't have an issue with that.

The point is if it's going to be a -- could someone have fired without knowing about it? That's been in this case from the outset, and there's absolutely no reason why this shouldn't have been brought up at the beginning of this case, and there's no reason why it couldn't have been brought up at the beginning of this case.

But the point is that the Court has noted there is no evidence, not a shred of evidence, that have any of these officers fall into the kind of sensory distortions that Professor Klinger says sometimes happen. There was not a single one of those perceptions, at least as I read the article, that occur in a majority of the cases. Most of them were somewhere between 35 and 50 percent, and there's no indication that they occurred in this case. And especially when you consider all of the people out at the scene were very experienced, very highly trained tactical officers, and there's nothing that I saw in his research that suggested that those people were particularly or more susceptible to the sort of sensory perception distortions.

And so that being the case, Judge, it just doesn't fit the facts of this case. It's not helpful to the jury to have somebody come in here and say, "Well, it could happen. We don't know if it happened in this case, but it's possible. It happens sometimes. We don't know if it happened here, but it's possible it could happen sometimes."

It's just not helpful, Judge.

THE COURT: As I stated before, there's no evidence that anybody, with the exception of the one who didn't know how many rounds he fired -- he certainly knew he was firing. It's not an absence of "I didn't know I was -- my gun went off."

There is no evidence that would justify the Court in allowing generalities of possibilities of something being the case.

On the other hand, some -- in the trial, if the defendant gets up and testifies that he has no memory -- he may well have fired the shots in dispute, but he has no memory of it -- that it's blocked out -- well, that isn't before the Court, and I don't know if it is going to be.

I don't have to speculate it.

So I'll wait and hear whether the defendant is going to testify; and, if so, if he's going to testify as to this particular issue. It will be excluded unless a foundation is laid.

Now, in respect to the -- that's a definitive ruling, to the extent it's possible.

When I say "it's definitive," unless the landscape changes with the testimony that would justify its admission, but certainly not on the record before the Court.

I really can't express my gratitude to the lawyers for the efforts you put in. It's just been a wonderful experience to have such competency from both sides. Particularly with complicated litigation like this, the work has been superb. I include in that, your offer -- your submission of the instructions. I'll give the preliminary instructions, but the issue is as to what am I going to instruct on and as to which counts? I would like to make a definitive ruling on the counts before we appear before the jury.

What is your position on Count 2?

MR. SUSSMAN: Your Honor, we moved to dismiss that this morning, and you granted it.

THE COURT: I know. I wanted to verify it.

Are there any other issues to be dismissed?

MR. SUSSMAN: Not at this time.

THE COURT: All right. Is there some issue as to it at another time? Are there some soft issues that you would rather not get into?

MR. SUSSMAN: Your Honor, we think -- well, we're convinced that the remaining counts are each properly charged as separate counts.

Now, one of the things that defendant has asked for in

their trial brief is that you reduce this entire case to a single count. But you can't do that because there are two separate substantive offenses, different statutes with different elements, and we can't just make one of them go away.

THE COURT: No. But take your hearings, your interviews, just -- you know, this morning we got whether we talk about a count or whether we talk about an interview -- Interview No. 2 and Count No. 2 -- and they weren't the same.

So run through it, step by step, as to what is left as to the interviews.

MR. SUSSMAN: All right. Well, there were two interviews with Oregon State Police detectives. The first on the night of the shooting itself, and the second --

THE COURT: Well, no, but what was said at that interview by whom and to whom?

MR. SUSSMAN: Well, that -- those were individual interviews, Your Honor. Each of the operators spoke to the state police detectives individually.

On the first interview, Mr. Astarita went into some detail talking about the events leading up to the -- the incident at the roadblock. He described how Mr. Finicum's truck came accelerating rapidly toward the roadblock; how he was convinced that the truck was not going to stop; how he believed everybody was there -- that was there, all the law enforcement officers, were in danger; how at the last minute Mr. Finicum's truck

swerved off into the snowbank, narrowly missing Special

Agent JN. Mr. Astarita firmly believed at the time that JN had

been struck and might be dead.

He talked, you know, about knowing that the occupants of the vehicle were armed and believed to be dangerous. He talked about hearing -- he talked about hearing no shots fired until the time when Mr. Finicum ended up being shot and killed by one of the state -- by the state police officers.

He never mentioned during that interview that he had fired. He never mentioned during that interview that he had picked up brass.

THE COURT: Did anybody ask him?

MR. SUSSMAN: Not specifically because --

THE COURT: Well, that's the problem.

MR. SUSSMAN: Well, let me finish, please, if you would, because they were told at the outset that no HRT members fired, and that was based on the earlier statements that were told to Supervisory Special Agent IM and Supervisory Special Agent BM, and so the -- those initial lies ended up triggering the statements to the state police detective saying none of the HRT guys shot. They were only witnesses.

And so that -- so that is what happened at that end.

THE COURT: Well, that wasn't -- what did the defendant say about shooting at that first interview?

MR. SUSSMAN: He did not say he shot at that first

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interview.
 1
 2
              THE COURT: He didn't say anything.
              MR. SUSSMAN:
                            Right.
 3
                         But he said all sorts of other things.
              THE COURT:
 4
              MR. SUSSMAN: Yes, he did.
 5
              THE COURT: He's charged with lying.
 6
 7
              MR. SUSSMAN: Engaging in misleading conduct.
                         Well, now, are we talking about a lie, or
 8
              THE COURT:
    are we talking about obstruction of justice?
 9
10
              MR. SUSSMAN: We're talking about one in the same.
                                                                   Ι
11
    mean, the charges --
              THE COURT: No, they're not the same.
12
                                                      They're
13
    separate counts.
14
              MR. SUSSMAN: The charge is obstruction of justice by
    engaging in misleading conduct. Misleading conduct is defined
15
16
    in the statute in several different ways.
17
              THE COURT: If you're offering that under the
18
    obstruction of justice, that's one thing. I'm asking you about
19
    the lies that he affirmatively denied shooting.
20
         Now, we know at the beginning he didn't affirmatively deny
21
    shooting. He said, "You can't ask me that now, bro," et
22
    cetera, or a similar account.
23
         That is not a specific confession "I did not shoot."
24
         Then we have this interview that we talked about. Again,
25
    he did not affirmatively say, "I did not shoot." But there
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were other occasions where he did, and that's what I want you
 1
 2
    to tell me.
              MR. SUSSMAN: Oh, okay. Sorry. I misunderstood you.
 3
         The case in where he affirmatively said, "I did not
 4
 5
    shoot", first of all, were made to his direct supervisor,
    Supervisory Special Agent BM, who said, "Are you okay?" and
 6
 7
    "Did you shoot?" And he affirmatively said, "I did not shoot."
                          Right. That was at the scene.
 8
              THE COURT:
 9
              MR. SUSSMAN: That was at the scene, and that's
10
    Count 1 of the indictment.
11
              THE COURT: Fine.
12
              MR. SUSSMAN: Then sometime later, within the next
13
    few days, Supervisory Special Agent TS again approached
    Mr. Astarita, along with BM and JN, and asked each of them, "Is
14
    it possible that you may have shot and not realized? Because
15
    if you did, we need to tell them." And to a man, according to
16
17
    TS, each of them specifically and explicitly denied shooting.
18
              THE COURT:
                          Including Astarita?
19
                             Including Astarita.
              MR. SUSSMAN:
20
              THE COURT: Okay. Now you've got the two.
21
              MR. SUSSMAN: That's Count 3.
22
              THE COURT: Then where do you go from there?
23
              MR. SUSSMAN:
                            Now, in between those two instances,
24
    after the lie to BM but before the lie to TS, Astarita is
25
    interviewed by the state police, and that -- for that
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interview, he's charged with obstruction of justice based on
 1
 2
    misleading conduct, because the state police officers are not
    federal law enforcement, and so 1001 doesn't fit.
 3
              THE COURT: So you're count what?
 4
              MR. SUSSMAN: That's Count 4, Your Honor.
 5
              THE COURT:
                          Yeah.
 6
 7
              MR. SUSSMAN: The second interview with the state
    police on February 6 is Count 5, and that's, again, obstruction
 8
    of justice by engaging in misleading conduct.
 9
10
              THE COURT: Perhaps I'm losing counts. If we exclude
    the ones where he didn't expressly say, "I did not shoot,"
11
12
    which -- the ones he did say, "I did not shoot," are the lying
13
    ones.
14
              MR. SUSSMAN: Correct.
15
              THE COURT: They are Counts 1 --
16
              MR. SUSSMAN: And 3.
17
              THE COURT: -- and 3. 2 is gone.
18
              MR. SUSSMAN: 2 is gone.
19
              THE COURT: So 4 and 5 are obstruction of justice?
20
              MR. SUSSMAN: Correct.
21
              THE COURT: That's what I wanted to know. Thank you.
         Now, your response, anybody?
22
23
              MS. FERGUSON: Yes, Your Honor. So the government
24
    has to -- has agreed to dismiss Count 2, which is one of the
25
    three false statement counts, but that still leaves two false
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statement counts and two obstruction of justice counts; so four 1 2 criminal lying charges in total. THE COURT: Wait now. Wait now. The lying counts 3 are No. 1 and --4 5 MS. FERGUSON: THE COURT: -- 3 okay. 6 7 MS. FERGUSON: Yes, Your Honor. So two false statements counts, 1 and 3; two obstruction counts, 4 and 5; 8 four criminal lying charges in total. And that's still three 9 10 too many criminal lying charges, because where there is one alleged lie and one alleged impairment stemming from that lie, 11 as a matter of law, that supports one crime -- one charge of 12 13 criminal lying. So we've asked the Court in our trial memo, 14 and I ask the Court now --15 THE COURT: You asked for that pretrial, and I already ruled on that when you moved to dismiss the indictment 16 for multiplicity, so I -- your position is the same? 17 18 MS. FERGUSON: Correct. And --19 That's the thing that I -- that I think THE COURT: 20 the -- I don't dismiss -- I won't grant that on grounds that 21 there involves similar -- same or similar conduct or 22 multiplicity counts. I've already covered that. But I am 23 concerned about the obstruction of justice. I'm not concerned about the two lying counts. That's fine. 24

The obstruction of justice counts, though, when somebody

25

is siting in a room and they're asking everybody, "Did anybody shoot?" and he doesn't stand up and say, "I did" or "I didn't" -- he doesn't say anything -- my issue is how can that be obstruction of justice?

MS. FERGUSON: Yes, Your Honor, and for the reasons stated in our motion to dismiss, we do believe that that's a problem, especially with respect to Count 5, where the definition of "misleading conduct" requires there to be a false statement or at least there to be a statement from which something is omitted that makes it misleading.

And so with respect to the second interview, if there's silence on the part of defendant, that does not satisfy the definition of misleading conduct.

THE COURT: That's my feeling. I want to hear the government's response on obstruction of justice.

MR. SUSSMAN: Well, first of all, we don't agree with the defense that the defendant said nothing. There was a characterization by a detective who --

THE COURT: Well, they say he didn't talk as much as he did before, but he -- when asked to state, "Did anybody shoot?" he said nothing.

That's my recollection of the evidence. Do you want to correct that?

MR. SUSSMAN: That is an incomplete understanding of the evidence, Judge.

You haven't heard the evidence yet. That's the problem 1 2 here. THE COURT: Well, let's hear what you've got. 3 MR. SUSSMAN: Well, we have testimony from a state 4 5 police detective who, as a matter of fact, conducted both interviews. He was one of the two detectives, was the same in 6 7 each interview. And that detective will testify that at the outset of the second interview he -- and this is the group 8 interview where they're all standing together in the gym. He 9 10 sets up a laptop computer on the bleachers and he shows the 11 overhead video from the FBI surveillance plane, and he stops it 12 about the time shots four and five happen. And he says, "All 13 right. Look, guys. The DA has already said that the shots we 14 know about are justified. We just need to clear up who fired the unattributed shots." And we looked at all of them, and he 15 said, "Did any of you shoot?" And they all denied shooting. 16 17 THE COURT: Right. They didn't deny shooting. They 18 didn't say anything. 19 MR. SUSSMAN: No. 20 THE COURT: At least as far as the defendant is 21 concerned. 22 MR. SUSSMAN: Well, as far as --23 THE COURT: He did not deny shooting. 24 MR. SUSSMAN: He was right there. 25 THE COURT: Well, he did not deny shooting, correct,

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except by inference?
 1
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              MR. SUSSMAN: Well, Agent BM, you know, said --
              THE COURT: Come on now.
                                        Let's --
 3
                            I'm trying to get there, Judge.
 4
              MR. SUSSMAN:
              THE COURT: Did he open his mouth and say, "I did not
 5
    shoot"?
             Did he say that? Yes or no?
 6
 7
              MR. SUSSMAN: One second.
              THE COURT: Come on. Don't get so hung up on your
 8
    advocacy that you're blurring the facts.
 9
10
         Well, let me put it this way: The evidence that I deduce
    will be forthcoming. And your offer of proof is that they had
11
    everybody there. They're trying to find out about the shots in
12
13
    dispute. They've cleared out the shots that killed Finicum.
14
    And they said, "Now, did anybody here shoot those two shots?"
    And the defendant said -- did not say. The defendant did not
15
    say, "I fired those shots" or "I deny firing those shots."
16
17
              MR. SUSSMAN: What we have in the report from the
18
    detective, Your Honor, is that it said none of them admitted
19
    shooting.
20
              THE COURT: Okay. That's where we are. So he didn't
21
    deny it, as in words. He may have by inference of his conduct.
22
    That's about where you are, isn't it?
23
              MR. SUSSMAN:
                            Right.
              THE COURT: Now, what did you say?
24
25
              MS. FERGUSON: Our argument is that silence, that
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making no statement, at all cannot be misleading conduct as a matter law.

THE COURT: I know that's what you think, but what does the law say about it that I instruct the jury? You can both answer.

MS. FERGUSON: Oh, the definition is that misleading conduct means knowingly making a false statement, intentionally omitting information from a statement, and thereby causing a portion of such statement to be misleading or intentionally concealing a material fact and thereby creating a false impression by such statement.

THE COURT: Okay. How do you match up to the instruction or the -- or the -- what was just stated?

MR. SUSSMAN: Well, at the very least, if they said, "None of us shot" --

THE COURT: They didn't say that.

MR. SUSSMAN: I believe at least BM said that. "None of us shot." Defendant is right there. Defendant hears him say that. Defendant says nothing. Defendant adopts that statement, by silence, as his own, and that's misleading because he shot, and he knew he shot. At least that's the government's allegation.

THE COURT: Your response?

MS. FERGUSON: Your Honor, we requested a jury instruction that silence, making no statement at all, cannot be

misleading conduct.

THE COURT: I know that's what you requested. I'm just asking you in respect to Mr. Sussman's statement.

MS. FERGUSON: Our position would be that even silence, in the face of a statement by another individual who is not on trial in this case, cannot constitute misleading conduct, and therefore cannot constitute obstruction of justice.

In addition, one of the detectives indicated that the defendant did not speak during that interview.

THE COURT: Yeah. Okay. My ruling is that that's not sufficient to justify obstruction of justice by just sitting there. This is a schooled person. He knows he does not have a legal duty to incriminate himself. His silence -- certainly, if he had been given Miranda warnings, his silence couldn't be issued -- concerned as a -- could not be -- qualify as an adoptive admission. This is a close question. Close questions go to the defense.

That count will be stricken.

Now, your other count for obstruction, I would like to hear again. What's your evidence going to be?

Hang in there. Do you want a break?

MR. SUSSMAN: No, I'm good.

The evidence is going to be he made a very detailed statement during that. He talked about what happened leading

up to the incident, what happened at the incident, and I don't believe he talked very much about what happened after the incident. But the one thing he never said during that second interview, despite talking about how he thought Finicum was going to hit the agent, how he thought the agent had been hit, what he did, where he went, he said he couldn't remember exactly where he was or exactly what he was doing because he was moving around. But the one thing he never said during the course of making all those statements is, "Oh, by the way, I shot." And that creates a misleading impression, and that is sufficient, even by Ms. Ferguson's definitions of obstruction of justice.

THE COURT: Your response?

MS. FERGUSON: Certainly, the defendant did not make a false statement in his January 26, 2016, interview with Oregon State Police detectives. He did not --

THE COURT: This is not the lying count. This is obstruction.

MS. FERGUSON: Correct. And with respect to Count 4, the defendant did -- did speak, so that distinguishes it from Count 5; but I think the government would have to then revert to the definition of misleading conduct that falls under 3(b), intentionally omitting information from a statement and thereby causing a portion of such statement to be misleading or intentionally concealing a material fact and thereby creating a

false impression of such statement, and our position is, of course, that the defendant did not shoot and, therefore, he did not lie and wasn't attempting to create any sort of a false impression about that.

THE COURT: Getting back to the prosecution, I'm going to deny the motion to strike that count. I think it's sufficient to justify submission, if you want to do that. You know, we've had a lot of cases together. And as a student, I said, "You're prosecutors. Try the case with your elbows in. Keep it simple. Keep it straightforward. Don't -- if you've got a strong count, stay with your strong count. Don't team up with some mushy count."

You've got flat-out statements that he lied. You've got, now, that -- the inference of obstruction of justice. I'll leave it in if you want, but it's your call.

MR. SUSSMAN: We'd appreciate it if you would. We would also appreciate it if you'd let us present our evidence on Count 5 before you decide to take it away from the jury.

THE COURT: Well, I asked you what your offer of proof was, didn't I?

MR. SUSSMAN: You did.

THE COURT: All right. I assume that I can rely on that as your offer of proof in final pretrial conference as to what your evidence will be.

MR. SUSSMAN: Well, of course the testimony is likely

to be in a lot more detail than an offer of proof here in 1 2 court, Judge. THE COURT: Well, this was your opportunity. If you 3 want, you can bring him in. We'll be available tomorrow. 4 5 MR. SUSSMAN: Well, Judge, I believe he's in Central Oregon, so -- but, in any event, et --6 7 THE COURT: He can testify on the phone, can't he? MR. SUSSMAN: We can try and find him, Judge. 8 In any event, I mean, I -- I know you had mentioned 9 earlier that the statements that were made during that second 10 interview might still be admissible regardless of whether the 11 12 substantive count was still there. THE COURT: Well --13 MR. SUSSMAN: Because we think that's part of the 14 15 whole -- the whole deceptive and misleading conduct, was the 16 fact that it happened not once but twice. 17 THE COURT: As I said, it's out as far as the count 18 is concerned, but not as -- as to what was -- what happened. 19 It's out as far as a count on Count 2, but you can certainly 20 offer it as relevant conduct. 21 MR. SUSSMAN: Count 5, Judge. THE COURT: 22 What? 23 MR. SUSSMAN: Count 5. 24 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SUSSMAN: Okay. Thank you.

25

THE COURT: How is our court reporter holding up?

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm fine.

THE COURT: What is your next issue?

MR. SUSSMAN: Judge, the defendant, in his trial memo, had requested to be able to ask leading questions of every government witness or every witness who works for the government, I should say, regardless of which party calls the witness as their own. He points out that Rule 611 does allow for leading questions of a witness on direct examination that's identified with an opposing party; but, of course, that's discretionary with the Court.

And it seems to me, Judge, that, you know, if they're going to call a witness as their own witness, then they ought to be able to do a direct examination of the witness without asking a ton of leading questions; and, along those same lines, what they're -- the HRT agents that we've been dealing with, we would submit that under their logic, Your Honor, those HRT agents are clearly identified with the defendant in this case. Their bro; one of their teammates. Some of them have been overtly hostile toward us as we've been preparing this case for trial.

So to the extent that they want to be able to ask leading questions of, for example, Deschutes County sheriff's deputies or Oregon State Police officers, then we should be able to ask leading questions of all the HRT guys, as well, or we can just

all do normal direct examinations and not lead our witnesses.

THE COURT: Well, as far as leading questions, there are, I think, nine exceptions to that rule. I've already told you that I encourage narrative questions. They don't have to all be Q and A. You know, you were there -- time, place, person, presence -- and tell us what you saw and observed happened. That's fine.

As far as leading is concerned, if there's any showing of hostility, even though they may be police officers, that doesn't mean that they side with one side or the other.

So we'll follow the general rules. You can ask narratives. I am not saying that you have to, but they aren't forbidden; secondly, we will follow the normal rules as to direct questions by the calling party, and if there's a showing of hostility, leading questions will be permitted.

That's where we are.

MR. SUSSMAN: Your Honor, one more thing, and this is kind of a logistical trial issue that came up, and that is the Daubert hearing. Counsel used a lecturn placed in front of the witness and directly in front of the jury box.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. SUSSMAN: Because I think that's probably what they're used to, especially the guys from D.C.

THE COURT: I use it here all the time.

MR. SUSSMAN: What's that?

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THE COURT: I use it here, quite frequently, for --
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 2
    the lecturn.
              MR. SUSSMAN: For witness examinations?
 3
              THE COURT: Oh, no. I'm sorry.
 4
 5
              MR. SUSSMAN: That's what I was getting at. At the
    Daubert hearing, that's one thing. There's no jury here.
 6
                                                                Ιt
 7
    doesn't really matter.
              THE COURT: Our standard procedure in this
 8
    jurisdiction is to ask questions from counsel table, so that's
 9
    what we'll do.
10
11
              MR. SUSSMAN: Very good. Thank you, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: Anything further for the government?
12
13
              MR. SUSSMAN: We've got a list we're going to
    double-check.
14
15
              MR. MALONEY: We're working our list, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: Well, let's take a break.
16
                                                      Fifteen
17
    minutes.
18
         Yeah, we still have the statistician that's different than
19
    the one we had before.
20
              MR. FRANCIS: Yes, Your Honor.
21
              THE COURT: We'll take that up after we get through
22
    our break.
23
                             (Recess taken.)
24
              THE COURT: All right. You want to take on the
    objection to the statistician?
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MR. MALONEY: Judge, we have consulted with counsel. We know who the statistician is. We have seen his -- his CV, but we have not seen his report, and that is waiting on a report from another defense expert, Mr. Liscio, and we haven't seen that report either.

So as we get those materials, if there are issues, we'll certainly identify them for the Court, after consulting with counsel, and seeing if we can't work something out; but we're not in a position to say that we agree to the admissibility of their testimony because we don't know what they're going to say.

THE COURT: Well, we will wait and see. What else do we have?

MR. MALONEY: Judge, I have some kind of "mode and manner of the presentation of evidence" questions. Mr. Sussman brought up the issue of questioning the witnesses from the podium. I understand the Court's -- we're going to adhere to the standard in this district and question from counsel table.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. MALONEY: Counsel had requested that the government's case agents not sit next to the jury. We were thinking we would have them sit directly behind us so that they're accessible to us through the proceedings but not to be a distraction or interference.

THE COURT: That's fine. You can have them at the

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counsel table. I don't care.
 1
 2
              MR. MALONEY: Just so the court is aware.
              THE COURT: Often we have the case agents at counsel
 3
    table.
 4
 5
              MR. MALONEY: We have three case agents on this case,
    Judge. We have --
 6
 7
              THE COURT: Just keep them back there. Well,
    whatever. I don't care.
 8
 9
              MR. MALONEY: I identify them only in case the Court
10
    had concerns about them being present during the testimony in
    the trial.
11
12
              THE COURT:
                           No.
              MR. MALONEY: And we intend to have the jury view
13
14
    during and as part of the presentation of Mike Haag's
15
    testimony.
16
              THE COURT:
                         Say that again.
17
              MR. MALONEY: We would like to do the jury view in
18
    conjunction with --
19
              THE COURT:
                          The jury view?
20
              MR. MALONEY: Of the truck, Your Honor.
21
              THE COURT: I thought you were going out in the
22
    boondocks.
23
              MR. MALONEY:
                            Do you want to take a road trip, Judge?
                          We'll have it downstairs.
24
              THE COURT:
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MR. MALONEY: That will be towards the end of the

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government's case, just so you get an idea of when to expect 1 2 it. THE COURT: Fine. 3 There was another thing. You didn't want the jury 4 fiddling around with the box. 5 MR. MALONEY: And we do not intend to offer the box 6 7 as evidence in this case. We may offer the box as a demonstrative aid for Mr. Haag to demonstrate the rocker --8 THE COURT: That's fine. 9 10 MR. MALONEY: Judge, you mentioned the possibility of doing an offer of proof tomorrow morning for the presentation 11 of evidence on Count 5. 12 THE COURT: Any time that's convenient. 13 14 accommodate you any time this week. We have other matters set, 15 but we can work it out. 16 MR. MALONEY: We appreciate the Court's advice to the 17 "elbows in" approach for the prosecution. We're going to 18 consider that. Right now we're trying to see when the witness 19 would even be available to make the trip. He's out of 20 Lakeview --21 THE COURT: I don't need him to be here. I can take 22 him over the phone. He can go to Kinkos, and we can take him 23 up on 16. 24 MR. MALONEY: We may well let the Court -- not ask

the Court to reconsider its ruling and proceed as the counts

25

currently stand, but we want to think that through and see how the rest of this case is going to shape up with the evidence that we have.

THE COURT: That's fine. You've got 100 witnesses and a thousand exhibits. A lot. Both sides should do some substantial trimming. That's just because of the -- the nature. I appreciate -- these are all contingent suggestions, not what's going to happen. So what I need is what's going to happen, so --

MR. MALONEY: To give the Court some idea of the reasoning behind the government's case, we are calling a number of witnesses only to establish the fact that they were at the scene and they did not remove any shell casings, and they have no knowledge of anyone removing shell casings. So those witnesses may go fairly quickly, but that's the -- there's a large amount of the government's case that is about --

THE COURT: Well, you can reach -- certainly, you can reach a stipulation that as to these people, that they didn't find anything or they didn't do anything, unless they have something else to offer.

MR. MALONEY: I understand. Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CARY: Your Honor, we have a number of items left to cover, and we can do them in whatever order you want, but here is what we see --

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THE COURT: I'll abide by your order. Whatever you
 1
 2
    want.
              MR. CARY: All right. The first thing, Your Honor,
 3
    is there are a number of stipulations in the trial brief that
 4
 5
    we just wanted to make note of. I think they're already in the
             I don't think there's a need to read them again, but
 6
 7
    there are a number of stipulations we've noted in our trial
    brief.
 8
              THE COURT: We don't need to read them. That's fine.
 9
10
                         The next is jury instructions, Your Honor,
              MR. CARY:
    if you intend to address jury instructions today.
11
12
                           I will read the stipulated fact
              THE COURT:
    situation. You want me to do that right at the beginning,
13
14
    don't you?
15
              MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: Yes, Your Honor.
16
              MR. CARY: Yes, Your Honor.
17
              MS. PERINI-ABBOTT:
                                   Sorry.
18
              MR. CARY:
                         No, that's yours.
19
              MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: I'm tasked with jury
20
    instructions, so I jumped in to answer that question.
21
              THE COURT:
                           Okay.
22
              MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: We're ready to address any other
23
    jury instruction issues now, or we can address them, perhaps,
    since one of the counts the government still may make an offer
24
25
    of proof on. The Court may want to hold off on other jury
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instructions.
 1
 2
              THE COURT: I have your defendant's proposed jury
    instructions.
                   I have the government's requested jury
 3
 4
    instructions. Let's put you to work. Why don't we take yours.
 5
              MS. PERINI-ABBOTT:
                                   Sure. We did come to agreement
    on the vast majority of jury instructions, the joint proposed
 6
 7
    jury instructions. The few that we did not reach agreement
    on --
 8
 9
              THE COURT:
                          That's the one I'm looking at.
10
              MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: So the first one we did not reach
    agreement on is whether or not the defendant is entitled to a
11
12
    specific unanimity instruction on the 1001 counts.
                          I'm looking at the correspondence I have.
13
              THE COURT:
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    These are only the instructions that you were unable to reach
15
    an agreement on.
16
              MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: Yes, Your Honor. The first
17
    one --
18
              THE COURT: I'm looking at page 3.
19
              MS. PERINI-ABBOTT:
                                   Yes.
                                         The first one is that we
20
    propose an "other acts of the defendant" instruction --
21
              THE COURT:
                           Yes.
              MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: -- to address --
22
23
              THE COURT:
                           Page 3?
24
              MS. PERINI-ABBOTT:
                                   Page 3.
25
          -- to address the issue of him being seen. Well, we don't
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know if it's him, as we've talked about with Motion in Limine

1, but various HRT operatives, and the government intends to

suggest that at least one of them was our client being seen

walking around, after the fact, picking up -- possibly picking

up shell casings -- at a minimum, bending down.

We want it to be clear to the jury that he's not charged with taking evidence or hiding evidence. Particularly, in a case where the issue is false statements and obstruction, we think it needs to be clear that that evidence is not -- is not the crime charged in this case, and that's why we propose that the Court use the pattern instruction for other acts of the defendant.

THE COURT: Counsel?

MR. SUSSMAN: This is not the pattern instruction, Judge. This has argumentative stuff.

THE COURT: I can't hear you. Speak into the mic.

MR. SUSSMAN: Is that better?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SUSSMAN: This was not the pattern instruction they're proposing here. This is a lot of their interpretation and their spin on the evidence. It is argumentative. It is not a neutral and balanced statement of the law, and we think there's some serious problems with it.

First of all, the very first paragraph says, "You have heard testimony and seen evidence that the defendant, at the

direction of his supervising agent, searched the scene with other FBI agents, looking for specific sensitive items."

That's their spin on the evidence. That's their interpretation of the evidence. And that is not the inference that we're going to be asking the jury to draw, and we don't think you should give the Court's imprimatur to their spin on the evidence.

If you want to give an "other acts" instruction, just give the pattern instruction without inserting comments on what their interpretation of the evidence is.

And then in the last paragraph it says here, "Remember that the defendant is on trial here only for making statements and obstructing justice by not making certain statements.

In fact, he is charged with obstructing justice by engaging in misleading conduct, which is broader than not making certain statements. So that is a misstatement of the law. It is a misstatement of the charge, and we think that this instruction is improper.

THE COURT: I will give the standard jury instruction, without the additional conduct which -- without the additional language which is italicized.

MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: Your Honor, just one point on this. And I apologize. Our instruction only cites MCJI 4.3, but MCJI 2.11 is the "other crimes" instruction that's given in the middle of trial, and it does ask that some summary of the

evidence be given, which was what I inserted in italics, what we expect the evidence will show with regard to this. Of course, maybe we could draft the language summarizing it once the evidence comes in because the government seems to think the evidence will come in differently than the defense expects.

THE COURT: I will be giving the standard instruction, and you can put whatever gloss you want on it.

MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: There will be some summary that we will have to come to agreement on.

THE COURT: I try not to mix the facts with the instructions. I'll give the -- the broad scope, and then you fill in the -- the rest --

MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- in your arguments.

Go ahead.

MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: The next instruction is on specific unanimity for Counts 1, at which can now be removed any reference to Count 2. The pattern instruction for 1001, although it's not in the text of the instruction, if you have the pattern jury instruction manual, the commentary makes explicit that a specific unanimity instruction is appropriate in certain circumstances for 1001 charges when the exact statement is not clear.

And here, because the indictment does not actually charge exactly what was said, we are asking that the jury be required

to agree on what was said, what was material, and what was 1 2 false, which is a correct statement of the law and sanctioned by the commentary of the Ninth Circuit pattern instructions. 3 Well, I -- you want to comment? 4 THE COURT: I can do better than comment, Judge. 5 MR. SUSSMAN: Ι mean, we prepared a bench memo for the Court on specific 6 7 unanimity, which I would be happy to forward to the Court; but, basically, the Ninth Circuit has said over and over and over 8 again that, generally speaking, a general unanimity instruction 9 10 is all that's required to tell the jury that they have to agree unanimously. Unless the count is so complex or so encompassing 11 12 that there's a real risk of confusion or a real risk that they're going to convict the defendant for conduct he did not 13 14 engage in or that was not charged in the indictment. 15 Judge, what we're talking about with the remaining false 16 statement counts is, "Did you shoot?" 17 "No, I didn't shoot." 18 It can't get any simpler than that. 19 THE COURT: I know. That's what I was trying to tell 20 you earlier. 21 MR. SUSSMAN: And that being the case --THE COURT: And not this adopted admission of --22 23 MR. SUSSMAN: That being the case, Judge --24 THE COURT: I know, but --25 MR. SUSSMAN: -- there's absolutely no need for a

specific unanimity instruction.

THE COURT: It's now been trimmed down by the Court, against your objection, to specific -- to a specific statement of denial, and so that's all I'm going to give, is just that they have to prove the elements of the offense to the satisfaction of each one, and that's just -- I'm not going to give this instruction --

MR. SUSSMAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: -- as such.

Obstruction of justice is on page 5.

MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: Yes, Your Honor. It might actually be helpful to take out the government's instruction on this count. They're not that different, but there are two specific differences that I want to highlight for the Court which -- where I think that our instruction is more in line with the Ninth Circuit pattern instructions and a little bit more clear.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: So if you look at the government proposed instructions on page 3 --

THE COURT: Okay. I've got it.

MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: -- they're largely the same. And here are the two differences, at least, that matter to us: In element two, they state only that the defendant acted knowingly. We suggest defining "knowingly" within that element

of the instruction, just as the pattern instructions do for 1 2 18 U.S.C. 1001. And if you want to, I can point you to where in the joint instructions it does so. But it's mostly for 3 4 consistency between the instructions that we define the element 5 there. THE COURT: I've got your point. Any objection? 6 7 MR. SUSSMAN: We just had knowingly in a separate supplemental instruction. 8 THE COURT: That's fine. I'll give it as you 9 10 requested. 11 MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: Okay. So, then, the other 12 difference we don't need to point out? 13 THE COURT: No. 14 MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: The next instruction we propose that differs from the government is in misleading conduct. 15 16 THE COURT: Yes. 17 MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: There are two differences between 18 our instruction and the government's on this. The first 19 instruction I would believe is likely an oversight by the 20 government, but then inserting the statutory definition of 21 "misleading conduct," they leave out the final words of 22 "created a false impression." That's where they stop the 23 sentence. And the actual sentence goes on "by such statement."

I'm on the fourth line of my first paragraph in the middle

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of the sentence.

So let me read the whole sentence. "The defendant engaged 1 2 in misleading conduct if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly made a false statement, intentionally omitted 3 information from a statement" --4 5 THE COURT: Wait. Wait. Did you look at the court reporter? 6 7 MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: Sorry. THE COURT: She's frowning. 8 MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: I will do better. 9 10 THE COURT: Okay. Slow down. 11 MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: -- "intentionally omitted 12 information from a statement and thereby caused a portion of such statement to be misleading, or intentionally concealed a 13 14 material fact and thereby created a false impression by such 15 statement." The government's proposed instruction just leaves off 16

The government's proposed instruction just leaves off those final three words which we think need to be in there to be consistent with the statute.

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The more substantive difference is that the government objected to our addition of the statement silence, i.e. making no statement at all, is not misleading conduct. The Court found that that essentially is a correct statement of the law in ruling on our Count 5 motion, and we think it belongs in the jury instructions as a correct statement of the law.

MR. SUSSMAN: Well, if you have taken Count 5 away,

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there's no allegation that he simply remained silent during the
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    conduct giving rise to Count 4. That being the case, there's
    no reason to have that line in there. If Count 5 was still in
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    there, they would have a better argument for it; but if Count 5
 4
    was gone, there is no issue of silence because he talked a lot
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    during the conduct giving rise to Count 4.
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 7
              THE COURT: It's changed materially, so you don't
    need that.
 8
 9
              MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: The Court will give the remainder
10
    of our instruction to ensure the complete statutory language?
11
    I'm comparing it to --
                          I don't know that I understand it.
12
               THE COURT:
              MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: If you look at page 5 of the
13
14
    government's --
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              THE COURT: I'm looking at page 6 of yours.
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              MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: Page 6 of mine -- of ours; page 5
17
    of the government's. If you look one, two, three -- fourth
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    line down on the government's, the sentence ends at "created a
19
    false impression."
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              THE COURT:
                           Yes.
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              MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: The actual statutory language in
22
    18 U.S.C. 1515, that sentence continues by saying "created a
23
    false impression by such statement."
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              THE COURT:
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              MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: That was likely an oversight by
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the government, but we ask that it be included. 1 2 THE COURT: "Knowingly" is defined on page 6 of the government. I thought we've already covered "knowingly." 3 MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: Yes. We covered "knowingly" in 4 5 the element, as we requested. THE COURT: Yes. Earlier. 6 7 MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: Yes. THE COURT: Yes, that's fine. It won't be repeated. 8 Okay. Then the next is your --9 10 MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: Our next proposed instruction is 11 defining a false statement, and that, in fact, is also covered 12 now that you've adopted our definition of the elements, so we will withdraw that one. 13 14 THE COURT: That's fine. Thank you. MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: Our final proposed instruction 15 relates to element four of 18 U.S.C. 1512. And I think this is 16 another situation in which we need to look at the government's 17 18 to understand the changes that we made. 19 THE COURT: All right. 20 MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: So if you'd look at the 21 government's at page 12. 22 THE COURT: All right. 23 MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: Let me flip back to our proposed

instruction. We essentially take issue with how broad of a

statement they were asking the Court to make at the beginning

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of this instruction where it says, "I instruct you that an alleged shooting by a law enforcement officer while acting under color of law does, in fact, constitute a potential federal offense." I think that it's more appropriate to actually just reference the statute where -- so the way we phrased it "The United States must prove that the information the defendant intended to prevent, hinder, or delay related to the commission or possible commission of a federal offense, specifically the use of unreasonable force under color of law."

THE COURT: Oh, wait now. You just jumped. I'm looking at your page 8.

The statement that any officer-involved shooting --

MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: Yes. In short, we believe our page 8 is a correct and complete statement of the law and that the government's version contains extraneous statements that, while may be technically true, are confusing to a jury. So in defining element four, we think our instruction is a more clear instruction.

MR. SUSSMAN: I think just the opposite, perhaps not surprisingly, because what their requested instruction number six does is it requires the jury to make a finding, essentially, of a civil rights violation. What the government's instruction says is that the excessive use of force by a law enforcement officer can constitute a federal offense. There's no requirement that they find the underlying

crime has occurred or that the defendant committed the underlying crime or that the defendant is guilty of committing the underlying federal offense, only that the federal -- that he acted with the intent to prevent the communication of the commission of a possible federal offense to a federal law enforcement agent, and there's just absolutely no question that the unreasonable use of force, under Section 242, is a federal offense, and so the jury need not -- I guess what they're inviting the jury to do is make a finding that the defendant, in fact, committed the underlying offense, and that is not required by the case law.

MS. PERINI-ABBOTT: Your Honor, if I may be heard? I think our instruction is explicitly clear that they need not make that finding.

I also think Mr. Sussman's statements emphasized why their first statement is confusing and perhaps a misstatement of the law. Their statement is, "I instruct you that an alleged shooting by a law enforcement officer" -- they have now zoomed out so far away from the actual crime of 18 U.S.C. 242, that it would be the equivalent of saying, "I instruct you that making any statement to a bank could be a federal offense." Sure, if it's false and it meets these other requirements.

I think if we use the actual language that Mr. Sussman used, some of our objection goes away. The use of excessive force or the unreasonable use of force, rather than just

instructing the jury that any alleged officer shooting could be a federal offense which unfairly implies, perhaps, that

Special Agent Astarita is being charged or could have committed some other federal offense and just dramatically oversimplifies what Section 242 really charges.

MR. SUSSMAN: She does make a valid point there,
Your Honor. Perhaps we could work on the language of that
requested element instruction and come back to the Court with
something that the parties can agree on.

THE COURT: That's fine, but I'm satisfied with the defense's request. If you want to modify it, just let me know.

MR. SUSSMAN: Okay. Thank you.

THE COURT: Now --

MR. CARY: Another issue on our list, Your Honor, is we've had a number of discussions with the government about whether witnesses will only be called one time; for example, if --

THE COURT: No, we'll just do it one time.

MR. CARY: Thank you, Your Honor.

The next issue is we very much appreciate, and I think the government does as well, the opportunity to use a jury questionnaire, and we think that's actually, hopefully, going to make jury selection go faster.

THE COURT: I'm not worried about the fastness. I'm worried about getting the job done. All right. Go ahead.

MR. CARY: I was hoping to inquire as to how jury selection is going to proceed once we have the questionnaires back just so we can understand logistically whether people will be seated in the box, whether you'll follow up. I want to understand.

THE COURT: What we do is we sit as many as we have seats here. We have the visitors move away from segments in the courtroom, and then we'll call the 14, and then I -- since we're using the questionnaire, it's going to cut down, that will give us the opportunity to look at the options. 16 options. Plus, I don't know how many peremptories you need for an alternative. I couldn't sell you on stipulating to less than 12, but I didn't expect it.

MR. CARY: Your Honor, we're not going to do that.

THE COURT: All right. So you'll know, so you can make an intelligent choice for both sides, as to who is going to be the option. So we'll be -- we might lose people, right, for cause, once they get in the jury box and start answering.

I will abandon my life sketch method I usually use because we already know all about their background, so I will be doing a minimum amount of the follow-up questions. I'll leave it up to counsel. I don't like your proposed follow-up questions. I'm not going to ask them. I'm not going to put the Court's imprimatur on questions such as, "The government charges only guilty people" or things of that nature, but you will have to

relook at yours to see if that's what you really want to ask a juror.

But both sides will be given the opportunity to follow up with questions. The government has the burden of proof, so the government will go first. And then we can do it with each -- the follow-up questions should -- they can be both general or you can pick out some juror, at your option, who said something that you wanted to inquire about. So we'll have the government go through with their questions of the whole panel or individuals, and we'll have you do the same thing, go through the whole panel of questions or follow-up questions.

It may be that you would prefer after the -- I'll ask you. What would be your preference as follow-up questions? Do you want to -- you've signaled -- who's going to handle the voir dire?

MR. MALONEY: I'm going to handle voir dire for the government, Judge.

THE COURT: What would be your preference as to if we ask for you to inquire of the jury? Do you want to do the whole thing at once, or do you want to take them one at a time?

MR. MALONEY: I'm comfortable either way, Judge. I can do the whole room if that's -- if that helps move things along.

THE COURT: I have no preference. I have -- do you have a preference?

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MR. ANGELI: Our preference would be individually,
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    Your Honor.
              THE COURT:
                          What?
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              MR. ANGELI: Our preference would be individually.
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              THE COURT: Okay. We'll take them one at a time.
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    That's fine.
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 7
         Now, have you had enough? Anything further?
              MR. MALONEY: Just to clarify, when we say "do them
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    one at a time, " I would like to voir dire the panel as a whole
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    and ask individual questions in follow-up from a general
    question down to an individual question. Is that permitted, or
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    do I have to question witness one and finish questioning that
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    witness or, I mean, juror -- juror two?
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              THE COURT: I asked you, first, what was your
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    preference, and you didn't state, that I heard, and then
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    counsel said he would like to do it one at a time. Now you've
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    asked to do it generally. I'll grant that to you.
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              MR. MALONEY: Thank you, Judge.
              THE COURT: You can do it, and then when -- if he
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    gets a response that you want to follow up on, you can do it at
21
    that time, so --
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              MR. CARY: Then, if I --
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              THE COURT: We're going to have the general
    statements by them, and then they're going to have
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    individual -- spot around individual questions; but once they
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go to individual questions, you can step in at that point. 1 2 MR. ANGELI: Okay. THE COURT: Will what work? 3 MR. CARY: Your Honor, I'm sorry. I have one other 4 5 question. Mr. Angeli is actually handling this. If he understands, I quess that's good enough, but when we offer 6 7 for-cause challenges, when would you prefer the for-cause challenges be made, Your Honor? 8 THE COURT: Oh, the challenge -- I thought we covered 9 10 We use both jury rooms. We send the jury out and -this. 11 DEPUTY COURTROOM CLERK: We wanted to do it like we 12 did it last time and just leave them all in here in order. 13 THE COURT: Whatever. They'll spot the jury away. 14 We never exercise challenges in front of the jury. And then if you get a challenge for cause, just hold that until -- let's 15 figure out what we're going to do with our -- after we impanel 16 17 the whole jury. You might change your mind. 18 MR. CARY: Okay. 19 THE COURT: The challenges for cause are always done 20 outside the presence of the jury. 21 MR. CARY: Right. 22 THE COURT: So what we'll be doing is that we'll send 23 them all out there. If you have a question -- a challenge for cause, I'll take it up at that time. That will give you 24

additional peremptories, so it's -- it will work out.

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The other thing is how do you want to handle it on your challenges? Of course, I would take the challenges for cause first, and then we clear those for both sides. But then when we get to the peremptories, do you want to do that by handing in your peremptories simultaneously, or do you want to do them you go first, they go, you go, they go, et cetera?

MR. MALONEY: We would prefer to take turns,
Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's fine. I don't care.

MR. ANGELI: That's fine with us, Judge.

THE COURT: That's fine. This really is no problem. It's just that we never embarrass jurors. When we tell them the rest of them can go, we don't even tell them who's been challenged. We just thank them for their service and go from there.

MR. MALONEY: Just so I'm clear, understanding the mode of the challenges, the government would challenge first with one challenge, defense would challenge next with two challenges on the peremptories, and then we would take turns back and forth until we are either out of peremptories or we're satisfied?

THE COURT: Yeah. Please don't be out of peremptories. You're getting too many anyway. Especially the defense.

All right. What else have you got?

Your Honor, I have one more issue, which 1 MR. CARY: 2 is openings. We have had some discussions about what we're going to use in opening, but I don't think we have a common 3 4 understanding of some ground rules in terms of what we can use. 5 THE COURT: You can use any -- have a seat. watched all sorts of openings, and it's essentially recognizing 6 7 this is not a time for argument. This is a time for you as to what you expect the evidence to be. I don't put a time limit 8 on your opening statements. 9 10 The next issue is to what statements you want -- what evidence you want to use to supplement your opening statements. 11 12 That's an individual advocate's point of view. Who's going to 13 make the opening statement for the government? 14 MR. SUSSMAN: I am, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: All right. What would be your position 16 on using exhibits in your opening statement? 17 MR. SUSSMAN: I typically don't. 18 THE COURT: What? 19 MR. SUSSMAN: I typically do not. 20 THE COURT: Okay. What is your position? 21 And we're willing to live by those same MR. CARY: rules, as long as it's the same for both of us. 22 23 THE COURT: All right. We won't use the exhibits 24 during the opening statement. That's fine. 25 MR. SUSSMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Again, this is your opportunity to state
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    what you want. I will have given the preliminary instructions
    so they'll have it. I'll also give them the statement of the
 3
    case. Do you want me to give them a copy of it or just read
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 5
    it?
              MR. CARY: Just read it, Your Honor, would be our
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 7
    preference.
              MR. SUSSMAN: That's fine, Your Honor. Thank you.
 8
              THE COURT: I'll just read it.
 9
                         I'm out of issues, Your Honor.
10
              MR. CARY:
              THE COURT: All right.
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         Well, it's 7:00 your time. Close.
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         Mr. Sussman, you're just getting started.
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              MR. SUSSMAN: Well, it's about that time, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: Yes.
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              MR. SUSSMAN: We're good.
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              THE COURT: Thank you. See you then.
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              MR. MALONEY: We haven't heard back from the witness,
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    Your Honor, so we'll be in --
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              THE COURT: I tell you what. I'm just going to use
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    the opening statement -- I mean, the offer of proof that I got.
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    Anything you want to do, you just submit it to me as an offer
23
    of proof.
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              MR. MALONEY: Thank you, Judge.
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              THE COURT: Thank you. So I'll see you next week.
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If you have any questions, please, please call me. have Becky set up a conference call, and so -- then also whether you need a reporter; but, just, let's not have a lot of new issues come at the last -- see you next week. (Hearing concluded.) 

CERTIFICATE United States of America v. W. Joseph Astarita 3:17-cr-00226-JO PRETRIAL CONFERENCE July 16, 2018 I certify, by signing below, that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the record, taken by stenographic means, of the proceedings in the above-entitled cause. A transcript without an original signature, conformed signature, or digitally signed signature is not certified. /s/Jill L. Jessup, CSR, RMR, RDR, CRR, CRC Signature Date: 7/20/18 Official Court Reporter Oregon CSR No. 98-0346 CSR Expiration Date: 9/30/20